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NOTES 
Clarifying a "Pattern" of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach 
to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement 
Although the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act ("RIC0")1 was enacted by Congress in 1970 primarily for the 
purpose of providing litigants with a potent new weapon to use against 
organized crime,2 the growing use by private plaintiffs of civil RICO's3 
treble damage remedy4 has greatly increased the exposure of legiti-
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). RICO was originally enacted as Title IX 
in the twelve-title Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §§ 1961-1968, 84 
Stat. 922, 941-48 (1970). 
2. The Senate noted that the bill's purpose was "the eradication of organized crime in the 
United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing 
new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the 
unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." S. REP. No. 617, 9lst Cong., 1st. Sess. 
2 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 SENATE REPORT]. See also notes 114-17 infra and accompanying 
text. 
3. RICO provides for both criminal penalties, 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), and 
civil sanctions, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Criminal RICO provides for criminal 
fines of not more than $25,000, imprisonment of not more than twenty years, and forfeiture of 
any interest in the racketeering enterprise for violations of one of RICO's proscribed activities. 
18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Civil RICO provides for divestment, imposition of 
restrictions, orders of dissolutions, and treble damages. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a)-(c) (1982 & Supp. 
IV 1986). Only private plaintiffs may obtain treble recovery. See§ 1964(c) and note 4 infra. 
While this Note's suggestions for the pattern requirement must apply to both the civil and 
criminal components of the statute, much of the abuse that has confronted the civil provision has 
not affected criminal RICO. This is principally because government prosecutors have not broad-
ened RICO's applications in the same way that civil litigants have. Indeed, these prosecutors 
have shown considerable restraint. See UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-110.200 
(Mar. 9, 1984) ("[l]t is the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uni-
formly used. It is the purpose of these guidelines to make it clear that not every case in which 
technically the elements of a RICO violation exist, will result in the approval of a RICO 
charge."); RICO: A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 99 (1985) ("Not every case that 
meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation will be authorized for prosecution .... 
RICO should only be invoked in those cases where it meets a special need .... "). See also 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[l]n the 
context of civil RICO ... the restraining influence of prosecutors is completely absent. Unlike 
the government, private litigants, ... lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's fees, 
have a strong incentive to invoke RICO's provisions."). 
Because of this lack of restraint in civil suits, several courts have held that the pattern re-
quirement should be restricted only in the civil RICO context. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 526-27 
(RICO's generally liberal construction clause does not necessarily apply to its civil provisions) 
(Powell, J., dissenting); Franklin & Joseph, Inc. v. Continental Health Indus., 664 F. Supp. 719, 
723 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (restrictive interpretation of pattern is appropriate in civil, but not criminal, 
context). While such a position might enable government prosecutors to avoid the hurdles that a 
restrictive view of the civil pattern requirement would erect, no evidence exists to suggest that 
Congress intended a different definition of pattern in the civil context. Further, civil RICO liabil-
ity is based on the same, specifically defined, criminal acts as criminal liability. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1961(1), 1962, 1964 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
4. RICO's private cause of action, contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), 
provides that "[A]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 
1745 
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mate businesses and individuals to the harsh penalties of RICO. 
While RICO's civil remedy was designed to allow citizens to sue and 
recover as "private attorneys general" in the fight against structured 
criminality, RICO claims are today being filed in a wide universe of 
commercial business disputes, and against a very diverse group of de-
fendants. 5 In fact, because of the relative ease with which a plaintiff 
can incorporate a RICO count into any civil complaint, the statute has 
been termed a plaintiff's "darling."6 
Although several courts have attempted to restrain these abuses by 
emasculating the treble damage remedy,7 the Supreme Court, in 
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 8 refused to grant the judiciary this re-
medial power. While acknowledging that "[civil] RICO [has] 
evolv[ ed] into something quite different from the original concep-
tion,"9 the Court stated that statutory amendments to civil RICO 
could not come through judicial intervention. Rather, they must come 
through legislative action.· Although the burden of restricting RICO 
was placed mainly on Congress, the Court did not foreclose all judicial 
efforts to limit the statute's applicability. Instead, Sedima specifically 
extended an invitation to the lower courts to develop a consistent defi-
nition of a key operative term in the RICO statute: the "pattern of 
racketeering activity" requirement. Io 
The RICO statute prohibits a person from investing, acquiring, or 
participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity. I I While fairly settled meanings of such operative 
1962 [see note 11 infra] ... may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and 
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee." Only private litigants may sue under § 1964(c), as the United States does not 
have standing under RICO to sue for monetary damages to its business or property. See United 
States v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, 683 F. Supp. 1411 (E.D.N.Y. 
1988) (denying government the standing under civil RICO to sue for monetary damages to its 
business or property). For the view that injury to "business or property" should encompass 
injury to a victim's person or body as well, see Note, Illegal Traffic in Women: A Civil RICO 
Proposal, 96 YALE L.J. 1297 (1987). 
5. See cases cited in notes 153-55 infra. 
6. See Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in the Public Interest: "Everybody's Dar-
ling," 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 655 (1982); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's 
Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165 (1980). 
7. See Part I.A. infra for discussion of these cases. 
8. 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
9. 473 U.S. at 500. 
10. 473 U.S. at 500. See also Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare v. lnryco, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 828, 
833 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Sedima creates a "whole new ballgame" as to the meaning of the pattern 
requirement). For the view that Sedima foreclosed any attempt to limit civil RICO through the 
"pattern of racketeering activity" requirement, see Note, Reconsideration of Pattern in Civil 
RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 83, 92-93 (1986). 
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) prohibits four types of offenses: 
1) § 1962(a) makes it unlawful to invest income in an enterprise that was derived "from a 
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt." 
2) § 1962(b) forbids "any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through col-
June 1988] Note - Civil RICO 1747 
terms as "person,"12 "enterprise,"13 and "racketeering activity"14 have 
been developed, a consistent definition of "pattern"15 has eluded the 
courts. Because RICO's framers believed that repeated, continuous 
demonstrations of illegal activity characterize professional criminal 
behavior, proving that the defendant has engaged in such a pattern of 
racketeering activity has become the focal point in many civil RICO 
disputes. 16 Clarifying the ambiguity over pattern is thus vital to civil 
lection of an unlawful debt to ... maintain •.• any interest in or control of any enterprise which 
is engaged in .•. interstate .•• commerce." 
3) § 1962(c) makes it unlawful for any person to conduct the affairs of an enterprise 
through a "pattern of racketeering activity or collection of an unlawful debt." 
4) § 1962(d) makes it illegal "to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), 
(b), or (c)." 
For purposes of§ 1962, plaintiffs must establish the separate existence of an underlying enter-
prise and a pattern of racketeering activity. In addition, the same entity cannot be both a RICO 
defendant and an enterprise under § 1962(c). Thus, the person who commits the pattern of 
racketeering activity under § 1962(c) must be separate from the underlying enterprise. See 
Robinson v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc., 674 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1987), appeal dismissed, 
841 F.2d 1127 (6th Cir. 1988) (Kidder dismissed as defendant because it cannot be both the 
racketeer and the underlying enterprise); Paradise Hotel Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 842 F.2d 
47, 53 (3d Cir. 1988) (single entity cannot be both defendant and the enterprise for the purposes 
of§ 1962(c)). 
12. A "person" is defined as "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial 
interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). Thus, a person for RICO claims can include corpo-
rations, associations, and partnerships. 
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) states that an "enterprise includes any individual, partnership, cor-
poration ... and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981), stated that an enter-
prise is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that 
the various associates function as a continuing unit." 
Using this definition, courts have held that enterprises may be legitimate business entities, 
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); labor 
unions, United States v. Scotto, 641F.2d47 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961 (1981); and 
law firms, United States v. Iannotti, 729 F.2d 213 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880 (1984). 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) defines "racketeering activity" as any act "chargeable" under a 
number of state and federal criminal laws, including murder, arson, and bribery. More impor-
tantly, this description includes "any act which is indictable under ... [18 U.S.C. §] 1341 [the 
federal mail fraud statute] , ... section 1343 [the federal wire fraud statute] ... or ... any offense 
involving ... fraud in the sale of securities .... " It is the inclusion of these predicate acts which 
has led to the unexpectedly broad application of civil RICO. See also notes 122 & 158 infra and 
accompanying text. 
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) reads, in pertinent part, that "'pattern of racketeering activity' re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred ... within ten years ... 
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." See Part II infra for further discus-
sion of§ 1961(5). Besides the requirement that the predicate acts occur within ten years of each 
other, the Supreme Court recently established a four-year statute of limitations for civil RICO 
actions. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 107 S. Ct. 2759, 2767 (1987). 
16. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158 ("The concept of 'pattern' is essential to 
the operation of the statute."). In fact, RICO defendants frequently use the plaintiff's failure to 
allege a sufficient pattern as a basis for a motion to dismiss pursuant to FED. R. C1v. P. 12(b)(6). 
These motions are filed in slightly over 90% of RICO cases, and granted over 51% of the time. 
The failure to allege a sufficient pattern is responsible for 40.4% of these dismissals. See Blakey 
& Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. 
Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 526, 619-22 (1987) (App. B) [hereinafter Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study]. Professor 
Blakey was Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures in 
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RICO's enforcement. Construing the requirement broadly would al-
low many claims to proceed whereas a narrow construction could re-
strict the statute's applicability.17 
Since Sedima, however, the confusion over what level of wrongful 
activity is required to trigger RICO liability has increased. In fact, the 
effort to define this concept adequately has become, as one court 
noted, a "cottage industry,"18 and has bitterly divided both courts and 
commentators.19 Three major approaches have emerged in the lower 
courts. The most restrictive view holds that a pattern is demonstrated 
only if the defendant's predicate acts (e.g., mail or wire fraud) occur in 
multiple and separate criminal schemes or episodes.20 Other courts 
have taken a more expansive view of pattern, stating that any two re-
lated predicate acts (e.g., two phone calls made in an attempt to de-
fraud) can constitute a pattern of racketeering activity and subject the 
defendant to treble damages.21 A third view has rejected any bright-
line test, instead preferring to analyze several factors on a case-by-case 
basis.22 
To illustrate the impact these positions can have, consider the case 
where a securities dealer, in a single sale, intentionally makes certain 
misrepresentations in the initial telephone calls as well as in a series of 
follow-up letters. In such a case, the proponents of the first view 
would dismiss the RICO claim since only a single commercial scheme 
1969-1970, when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941, 
was considered. He remains RICO's foremost academician, and often argues in favor of ex-
panding the federal racketeering laws. Cf. Banque Worms v. Luis A. Duque Pena & Hijos, Ltd., 
652 F. Supp. 770, 772 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The rather broad draftsmanship of RICO has 
resulted in its expansive application. [Professor Blakey] has stated that this broad application is 
what he intended. There is no indication, however, that the Congress which passed the bill was 
adopting his intentions.") (emphasis in original). 
17. The Sedima Court noted the impact that differing concepts of pattern could produce by 
stating that the admitted breadth of the statute derived mainly from the "failure of Congress and 
the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' " 473 U.S. at 500. 
18. Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). One federal appeals court 
judge called the "pattern jurisprudence" a "mess,'' a "cacophony," and "sheer bedlam.'' 
Furman v. Cirrito, 828 F.2d 898, 908-10 (2d Cir. 1987) (Pratt, J., dissenting). 
19. For a description of the academic confusion over the pattern requirement, see note 86 
infra. 
20. The Eighth Circuit is the only appellate court accepting the multiple schemes approach. 
See Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986). However, numerous district 
courts have accepted this position. See note 57 infra and cases cited therein. In addition to 
multiple schemes, some courts have adopted the slightly less restrictive multiple or different 
"episodes" test. For cases following this approach, see notes 66-70 infra. 
21. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
3230 (1987); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985). Cf. Montesano v. 
Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1987) (following R.A.G.S. but requesting its 
reversal en bane; pattern requires more than just two isolated acts). 
22. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, 832 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 
1987) (analyzing such factors as the number and similarity of unlawful acts, the duration of the 
illicit activity, and the number of victims); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 30-31 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (same); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (same; also 
focusing on the occurrence of distinct injuries). 
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to defraud is involved. Conversely, advocates of the second view 
would clearly support the finding of a pattern, because more than two 
related predicate acts are involved. The issue would be less clear for 
those holding the final position, because while several predicate acts 
are alleged, the duration of the overall fraud might not be enough to 
encompass a pattern. · 
This inconsistent application has resulted in unseemly forum-shop-
ping.23 Currently, similarly pied complaints can survive in the Sec-
ond, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, which often adopt the expansive view, 
but be dismissed in the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, which utilize a 
more restrictive approach. The possibility exists that with the same 
set of facts, plaintiff's counsel could obtain a large treble recovery in 
one court, but suffer sanctions for bringing the same action in a differ-
ent court. 24 The recent decision by the Supreme Court to grant certio-
rari in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. 25 may result in a 
reduction of these inconsistencies. 
In an attempt to provide some needed definitional clarity and redi-
rect civil RICO toward its intended focus, this Note argues that the 
federal judiciary should interpret the pattern requirement narrowly, 
focusing on four basic factors that best demonstrate a prolonged, con-
tinuing example of criminal activity. By emphasizing (1) the presence 
of multiple victims, (2) the duration of the RICO defendant's criminal 
activity, (3) the number of illicit commercial transactions, and (4) the 
existence of independent criminal decisions, courts could consistently 
limit civil RICO to the most pernicious offenders. Part I of this Note 
will examine judicial interpretations of RICO and the current 
problems plaguing the application of the pattern requirement. Part II 
will analyze several techniques of statutory construction and will ar-
gue that while the operative pattern provision may be somewhat am-
biguous, it can certainly support a narrow construction. Part III will 
examine the two primary justifications for interpreting the pattern re-
quirement narrowly and will show that the original legislative com-
mand that RICO apply only to defendants engaged in repetitive and 
continuous criminal behavior has been ignored. Part IV identifies the 
goals for an optimal definition of pattern and examines the four factors 
necessary to limit civil RICO to repeat offenders. This section will 
23. Not only do the different applications of pattern encourage litigants to search for the 
most sympathetic forum, but RICO's liberal venue and service of process provisions allow plain-
tiffs to sue in a wide range of district courts. Because 18 U.S.C. § 1965{b) (1982) authorizes 
nationwide service of process, there are no obstacles to suing RICO defendants in any state, 
unlike diversity cases which require that the defendant possess minimum contacts with the forum 
state. See Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987). 
24. Courts are increasingly imposing attorney sanctions under FED. R. C1v. P. 11 for what 
are presumed to be frivolous RICO claims. See, e.g., Nassau-Suffolk Ice Cream, Inc. v. Inte-
grated Resources, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
25. 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). For further discus-
sion and analysis of this case, see notes 225-31 infra and accompanying text. 
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also discuss two recent cases, including the one currently before the 
Supreme Court, and will illustrate how these factors should be applied 
by the courts. Finally, Part V will briefly discuss the broader question 
of how to amend civil RICO permanently and will analyze and cri-
tique the congressional proposals currently pending. 
I. CIVIL RICO'S JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND 
THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY 
The judiciary's active treatment of civil RICO can be separated 
into two distinct eras: the cases decided before and after Sedima. 
Concerned with the expanding applications of RICO, several courts 
crafted a number of additional requirements onto the statute. In con-
clusively rejecting these attempts, the Sedima Court also directed 
lower courts to develop and apply a consistent meaning of the pattern 
requirement. Since then, the entire federal judiciary has struggled to 
fulfi11 this directive. Of the three major positions developed by the 
courts, only one, the multiple factors approach, comes close to provid-
ing the necessary consistency and respect for congressional intent. 
A. Early Attempts To Restrict Civil RICO: The Pre-Sedima Cases 
In response to the growing use of RICO in areas and against de-
fendants that Congress never intended, judicial hostility toward civil 
RICO began to rise.26 Rather than accept these suits, many district 
courts began attempting to confine RICO to traditional organized 
crime by imposing a number of limitations on the statute. These 
courts reasoned that since Congress could not have intended to feder-
alize all "garden variety" fraud claims, the judiciary was in the best, 
and only, position to impose limitations on private RICO actions; this 
was especially true given the lack of "prosecutorial restraint" in the 
marginal civil cases. 21 
Between the mid-1970s and Sedima (in 1985), the courts fashioned 
four restrictions on civil RICO claims. The initial effort concerned 
attempts to impose an "organized crime" requirement on the statute. 
Under this approach, plaintiffs were required to establish that the de-
fendant or his activities had some connection to organized crime. 28 In 
denying a RICO claim, one court noted the "patently unfair" implica-
tion that the defendant, a telephone answering service, was somehow 
26. See, e.g., Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 & nn.2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting 
from 1969 testimony of the Attorney General of the United States before a Senate Subcommittee, 
the court noted that RICO was aimed not at legitimate business organizations but at combating 
"a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the control of the American people and 
their government"). 
27. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1361 (S.D.N.Y.), ajfd., 719 
F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984); see also note 3 supra (discussing 
prosecutorial restraint). 
28. See, e.g .. Barr. 66 F.R.D. at 113. 
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involved in organized crime.29 However, while RICO may have been 
intended as a weapon against organized crime, the statute obviously 
does not contain a requirement that defendants be a member of a class 
of organized criminals. 30 Because the statute explicitly rejects this re-
quirement, and because imposing this additional RICO pleading re-
quirement constituted an impermissible example of judicial legislating, 
most courts rejected the organized crime requirement.31 
A second method used by the courts to curb inappropriate civil 
RICO claims was to require plaintiffs to prove some type of "competi-
tive injury." Rather than recognizing injuries resulting from the de-
fendants' predicate offenses, these courts allowed RICO liability to 
attach only when a plaintiff was injured by having to compete with an 
enterprise that had garnered an unfair market advantage by using in-
come obtained from racketeering activity.32 The primary justification 
for this requirement was that because the civil treble damage remedy 
was modeled after the remedies contained in section 4 of the Clayton 
Act, 33 and because this language has been interpreted to require anti-
trust plaintiffs to show a competitive injury,34 the courts reasoned that 
civil RICO should contain the same requirement.35 Most courts, how-
ever, rejected this analysis, stating instead that the plain language of 
RICO mentions nothing about any competitive injury requirement.36 
These courts also rejected the concept that RICO is a sister to the 
antitrust laws. Rather, they suggested that RICO has broader aims 
and in fact was enacted "as a separate tool in the fight against orga-
29. 66 F.R.D. at 113. 
30. For reasons why this requirement, if included, would be unconstitutional, see notes 118-
19 infra and accompanying text. 
31. See, e.g., Owl Constr. Co. v. Ronald Adams, 727 F.2d S40, S42 (Sth Cir.), cert denied, 
469 U.S. 831 (1984); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 13S3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
1002 (1983). 
32. See, e.g., North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, S47 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980); 
Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, S66 F. Supp. 123S, 124I (S.D.N.Y. I983), affd on other 
grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 74I F.2d Sll (2d Cir. I984). 
33. Section 4 of the Clayton Act, IS U.S.C. § IS (I982), states that "Any person who shall be 
injured in his business or property . . . may sue therefore in any district court ... and shall 
recover threefold the damages .... " Because this language is virtually identical to the language 
in § I964(c), see note 4 supra, some courts felt that the restrictions placed upon the antitrust laws 
should also restrain civil RICO. See note 3S infra. 
34. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (I977) (Clayton Act 
§ 4 requires plaintiff to show competitive injury to recover treble damages). 
3S. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesmann, S66 F. Supp. I23S, I24I (S.D.N.Y. I983), affd. on 
other grounds sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 74I F.2d Sll (2d Cir. I984) (because 
RICO's civil remedy was modeled after relief available in antitrust area, it is appropriate to limit 
the § I964 private remedy to plaintiffs who have suffered a competitive injury). See also Com-
ment, Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U. 
L. REV. IOO, I29-30 (1981) ("the fact that§ 1964(c) was patterned after antitrust remedies rein-
forces the notion that Congress was concerned with competitive injury") (emphasis in original). 
36. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 13S8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); 
Bennett v. Berg, 68S F.2d 10S3, 10S9 (8th Cir. 1982), affd., 710 F.2d 1361 (en bane), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 1008 (1983). 
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nized crime."37 
The final two attempts to restrict civil RICO occurred in the Sec-
ond Circuit's Sedima decision. 38 There, the court held that standing 
in civil RICO suits could only be given to those who suffered "an in-
jury of the type RICO was designed to prevent."39 In construing sec-
tion 1962 to require a "racketeering injury," the Second Circuit joined 
the several district courts which had adopted a similar standing re-
striction. 40 But more importantly, the court held that, before the 
treble damage remedy could be imposed, the defendant must first have 
been convicted of either a section 1962 offense or the underlying predi-
cate offenses.41 By formulating this prior conviction requirement, the 
court adopted a severely restrictive interpretation of civil RICO; for 
the Second Circuit, the only way to contain the "explosive" use of civil 
actions against "respected businesses" was to require a criminal con-
viction before imposing treble damages. 42 
Not only did this decision disregard prior case law43 and congres-
sional intent, but it markedly increased the call for an end to all the 
judicially imposed restrictions and requirements. Commentators as-
serted that until Congress manifested a contrary intent, the "federal 
judiciary should not restrict a statute whose plain language directs a 
sweeping attack at deeply entrenched economic and societal ills. "44 
With the debate over the propriety of judicial reform of RICO grow-
37. Schacht, 711 F.2d at 1357. 
38. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984), revd., 473 U.S. 479 (1985). 
39. 741 F.2d at 495. 
40. See, e.g., Margolis v. Republic Natl. Bank, 585 F. Supp. 595, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); 
Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208-09 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
41. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 496 (holding that "a prior criminal conviction is a prerequisite to a 
civil RICO action."). See note 11 supra for a list of the § 1962 offenses. 
42. 741 F.2d at 500-04. Writing for a divided panel, Judge Oakes noted that since civil 
RICO suits did not contain an organized crime requirement, "some ••• courts ••• read various 
limitations into the act in order to conform its use to that thought to best effectuate the congres· 
sional purpose." 741 F.2d at 492. 
43. Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1287 (7th Cir. 
1983); USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.l (6th Cir. 1982). 
44. Note, The Conflict over RICO's Private Treble Damages Action, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 
902, 939 (1985). Numerous other commentators, both before and after the Second Circuit's 
Sedima opinion, were highly critical of the judicial attempts to limit RICO by fashioning new 
statutory restrictions. See Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflict-
ing Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMPLE L.Q. 731, 746 (1984) (the various 
restrictions imposed on civil RICO by the district courts amount to an impermissible rewriting of 
the statute); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restrictio11s, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1101, 1118-20 (1982) (courts should defer to broad congressional intent and not 
undertake unwarranted restrictions of RICO claims); Comment, Putting a Halt to Judicial Limi-
tations on Civil RICO, 52 UMKC L. REV. 56, 71 (1983) (courts should refrain from tampering 
with RICO because the effect of judicial restriction conflicts with the broad goals Congress had 
for the statute); Comment, Civil RICO: Pleading Fraud for Treble Damages, 45 MONT. L. REV. 
87, 111 (1984) (to limit frivolous suits under RICO, "courts should impose existing civil sanc-
tions rather than change the substantive law" (footnote omitted)). But see Note, RICO a11d 
Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1543 (1983) (restricting 
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ing, and the confusion over how to reverse exploding applications in-
creasing, the need for clear Supreme Court guidance was obvious. 
B. The Sedima Decision and Its Implications for Further Judicial 
Restriction of Civil RICO 
The Supreme Court's Sedima decision provided only partial gui-
dance; while it firmly rejected the prior attempts to eviscerate civil 
RICO, the Court opened up a new avenue for narrow construction of 
the statute. In reversing the Second Circuit, a sharply divided Court 
(per Justice White) rejected both the prior conviction and racketeering 
injury requirements. Finding support for a criminal conviction pre-
requisite in neither the statutory language nor the legislative history, 
the Court concluded that this requirement "would be inconsistent 
with Congress' underlying policy concerns. Such a rule would se-
verely handicap potential plaintiffs .... Private attorney general provi-
sions such as § 1964( c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial 
gaps."45 As for the racketeering injury limitation, the Court rejected 
any additional standing requirements for section 1962 claims and 
added that plaintiffs can recover as long as they show injury to their 
business or property through a RICO predicate offense.46 While the 
Court expressed grave doubts over the expanding applications of civil 
RICO, the majority stipulated that this problem should be cured 
through legislative amendment rather than through judicial fiat.47 
Because Sedima represented the Supreme Court's first examination 
of civil RIC0,48 its rejection of the varied attempts to limit RICO 
liability is surely meaningful. Limitations like the prior conviction re-
quirement would have completely emasculated the treble damage 
weapon in violation of the intention of its authors. Yet it must be 
emphasized that Sedima did not extinguish all attempts to limit the 
scope of this private remedy. In the now-famous footnote 14, Justice 
White explored the parameters of the pattern requirement, even 
though this issue was not even before the Court. Indeed, Justice 
White specifically attributed the "extraordinary" reach of civil RICO 
to the "failure of Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful 
concept of 'pattern.' "49 To aid the lower courts in their effort to de-
velop this concept, White emphasized that the target of RICO was not 
sporadic activity; rather, "[t]he legislative history supports the view 
RICO in securities fraud cases is a desirable way to achieve goal of applying statute against 
organized crime). 
45. 473 U.S. at 493. 
46. 473 U.S. at 493-95. 
47. 473 U.S. at 499 ("[RICO's] defect •.. is inherent in the statute as written, and its correc-
tion must lie with Congress."). 
48. The Supreme Court's two prior RICO cases involved criminal RICO. Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
49. 473 U.S. at 500. 
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that two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pat-
tern. "50 Given this intent, and the statement that the elements of 
"continuity plus relationship" combine to produce a pattern,51 the 
Court clearly signaled that a more restrictive interpretation of pattern 
was allowable. 
C. The Post-Sedima Debate over the Pattern Requirement 
Given that Sedima precluded restrictions that would vitiate the 
private treble damage remedy while inviting courts to limit the pattern 
requirement, the debate over RICO's scope has now centered on the 
definition of pattern. In the past three years, courts have had great 
difficulty interpreting Sedima's invitation to develop a consistent defi-
nition of pattern. In part, this is because Sedima asked the courts to 
read RICO broadly but to read the pattern requirement narrowly. 
Mostly, however, confusion has resulted from the Court's failure to 
provide adequate direction in footnote 14. While the Court said that a 
pattern had to combine "continuity plus relationship" and include 
"more than two isolated acts,"52 it did not elaborate on how many 
"acts" or how much "continuity" was required. As a result, the fed-
eral judiciary has developed three differing views as to what the pat-
tern requirement means. 
1. ''Multiple Schemes" and ''Different Episodes" 
Just four weeks after Sedima was decided, the first attempt to rede-
fine the pattern requirement . appeared. In Northern Trust Bank/ 
O'Hare, N.A. v. lnryco, Inc., 53 the defendant was accused of participa-
ting in a construction kickback scheme implemented through two acts 
of mail fraud (mailing the subcontract and mailing the kickback 
check). Noting that "Sedima ... create[d] a whole new ballgame," 
Judge Shadur asserted that Sedima's "message was both plain and de-
liberate: Lower courts concerned about RICO's expansive potential 
would be best advised to focus on the hitherto largely ignored 'pattern' 
concept."54 In response to this "concern," the court held that, while 
the two acts were clearly related, the pattern requirement was not met 
because continuity of activity was absent. Pattern, Judge Shadur 
noted, "connotes a multiplicity of events: Surely the continuity inher-
ent in the term presumes repeated criminal activity, not merely re-
peated acts to carry out the same criminal activity. It places a real 
50. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
51. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (quoting from 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158). 
52. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
53. 615 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (Shadur, J.). It must be noted that Inryco is no longer 
valid law in the Seventh Circuit. See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 
1986). 
54. 615 F. Supp. at 832-33. 
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strain on the language to speak of a single fraudulent effort, imple-
mented by several fraudulent acts, as a [pattern]."55 The court added 
that even if the complaint had alleged further acts of mail fraud (in 
addition to the two mailings), a pattern would still not have been 
shown because only one overall kickback scheme was demonstrated. 56 
lnryco thus represented a key restriction on section 1962 claims; under 
this approach, the issue became not how many illegal acts the defen-
dant committed, but how many separate schemes of illegal activity 
could be demonstrated. 
Requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate two separate schemes in or-
der to show continuity has been widely accepted on the district court 
level.57 However, lnryco's logic has been criticized by several com-
mentators, 58 rejected by several courts of appeals, 59 and followed at 
the appellate level only by the Eighth Circuit in Superior Oil Co. v. 
Fulmer. 60 In Superior Oil the defendant had been unlawfully process-
ing gas from the plaintiff's pipeline, and had committed several acts of 
mail and wire fraud in pursuit of this one underlying activity.61 In 
holding that this did not possess the requisite continuity needed for 
pattern, the court stated that "there was no proof that [defendants] 
had ever done these activities in the past and there was no proof that 
they were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere."62 As only 
"one isolated fraudulent scheme" was alleged, the court dismissed the 
RICO claims and restricted plaintiff's recovery to other federal and 
state fraud claims. 63 Because the multiple schemes approach results in 
the dismissal of claims where the predicate acts all occurred within a 
single scheme, Superior Oil and the Eighth Circuit decisions that have 
followed it64 illustrate the narrowest construction of the pattern re-
55. 615 F. Supp. at 831 (emphasis in original). This interpretation of the pattern requirement 
first appeared in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975). In fact, 
Inryco quotes Moeller at length, and even suggests that "Moeller has now been vindicated" by 
Sedima. 615 F. Supp. at 832. 
56. 615 F. Supp. at 833. 
57. See, e.g., Castle v. Cohen, 676 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Pa. 1987), affd., 840 F.2d 173 {3d Cir. 
1988); Johnson v. Schopf, 669 F. Supp. 291 (D. Minn. 1987); Petrie v. United Bank of Skyline, 
N.A., 676 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1987); Zahra v. Charles, 639 F. Supp. 1405 (E.D. Mich. 1986). 
58. Black, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) - Securities and Com-
mercial Fraud as Racketeering Crime After Sedima: What is a "Pattern of Racketeering Activ-
ity"?, 6 PACE L. REv. 365, 383 (1986); Moran, The Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 CHI.-KENT 
L. REv. 139, 154-57 (1985); Note, RICO: Limiting Suits by Altering the Pattern, 28 WM. & 
MARYL. REV. 177, 200-01 (1986). 
59. See, e.g., California Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 
1466, 1469 & n.1 {9th Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988). See also notes 65 & 89 infra. 
60. 785 F.2d 252, 257 {8th Cir. 1986). 
61. 785 F.2d at 253-54. 
62. 785 F.2d at 257. 
63. 785 F.2d at 257, 259. In the trial court, the jury awarded over $145,000 to the plaintiff 
for wrongful conversion; $25,000 for the RICO claim, and over $26,000 for another claim. The 
trial court then trebled the damages. 785 F.2d at 253. 
64. See, e.g., Madden v. Gluck, 815 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 
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quirement developed to date. 
Recognizing that the multiple schemes approach can lead to "un-
tenable result[s],"65 several courts have developed a slightly less re-
strictive variant. 66 These courts have determined that a single scheme 
can constitute a pattern if it involves different criminal episodes. 61 An 
"episode" has been construed to require several separate transactions, 
even if the single scheme involves the same wrongdoers and the same 
victims. One implication of this approach is that fraud or other mis-
conduct committed in the course of a single transaction will never con-
stitute a pattern. As a result, courts have refused to find a pattern 
arising out of a single contract or sale of goods, a single audit engage-
ment, or a single merger agreement or tender offer.68 However, a 
demonstrated number of independent criminal episodes, even if perpe-
trated under one continuing scheme, can comprise a pattern of ongo-
ing conduct. 69 Besides generating substantial judicial support, the 
different episodes test has been endorsed by two American Bar Associ-
ation committees. 10 
2. A Sole Focus on Relatedness 
The broadest construction of pattern can be found in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in R.A. G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 71 the first appellate 
decision to comment on Sedima's footnote 14. In R.A.G.S., the de-
86 (1987); Ornest v. Delaware North Cos., 818 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1987). But see H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Tel., 829 F.2d 648, 651 (8th Cir. 1987) (Gibson, J., concurring) (requesting 
reconsideration of Superior Oil), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988). 
65. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (criticizing multiple 
schemes approach because it can never impose liability on a defendant who has committed a 
single but large and ongoing scheme). 
66. In Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 324 (7th Cir. 1986), the Seventh Circuit 
noted that "[a]n episode is apparently something more than an act of racketeering activity but 
something less than a scheme." 
67. This position was first devloped in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D, 
Conn. 1975). For decisions that have followed this approach, see cases collected in Note, RICO: 
Limiting Suits by Altering the Pattern, 28 WM. & MARYL. REV. 177, 199 n.128 (1986). 
68. See, e.g., Frankart Distrib. Inc. v. RMR Advertising, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) (single contract); In re Evening News Assn. Tender Offer Litig., 642 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. 
Mich. 1986) (single tender offer); Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Natl. Bank, 638 F. Supp. 118 
(D. Md. 1986) (single merger); Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, 616 
F. Supp. 1418 (W.D. Okla. 1985) (single audit engagement). 
69. See, e.g., Graham v. Slaughter, 624 F. Supp. 222, 225 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (continuity "re-
quires more than a single transaction but not necessarily more than a single scheme"). 
70. See REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECflON OF 
CoRPORATION, BANKING AND Bus. L. 206-07 & n.333 (1985) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE 
REPORT] (specifically adopting test outlined in United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. 
Conn. 1975)); ABA SEC. OF CRIM. JUST., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 5·6 (1982), 
reprinted in ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra, app. B (also adopting the Moeller test). 
In addition to these endorsements, the Department of Justice in 1981 mandated that RICO 
prosecutions should not be brought if only a "single criminal episode" was involved. See 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL, § 9-110.340. 
71. 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1985). 
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fendant allegedly defrauded the plaintiff by twice mailing him false 
invoices. Despite Sedima's emphasis on relationship and continuity, 72 
the court held that continuity was unnecessary. The Fifth Circuit de-
clared: "The Supreme Court in Sedima implied that two 'isolated 
acts' would not constitute a pattern. In this case, however, the alleged 
acts of mail fraud are related."73 Thus, for the R.A. G.S. court, a pat-
tern required only two related mailings in furtherance of a single 
fraud. 74 
The implications for civil RICO of such an interpretation of pat-
tern are considerable. For example, under R.A. G.S., two phone calls 
made in an attempt to defraud a single plaintiff out of $1,000 could 
expose the defendant to treble damages and the stigma of the "racke-
teer" label. 
While R.A. G.S. has come under heavy criticism, both from other 
courts and from its own circuit, 75 some courts have agreed with the 
Fifth Circuit. In California Architectural Building Products v. Francis-
can Ceramics, 76 the Ninth Circuit also rejected a continuity require-
ment, holding that "the plain words of RICO ... define[ ] 'pattern of 
racketeering activity' without mentioning continuity."77 Instead, the 
court held that several related acts committed in furtherance of a 
single criminal episode were sufficient to form a pattern. 78 The Ninth 
Circuit also noted that "[t]he dictum in Sedima is suggestive, but with-
out additional explication by the Supreme Court we decline to follow 
its lead. "79 
72. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
73. 774 F.2d at 1355 (citation omitted). 
74. 774 F.2d at 1355. 
75. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 928 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987); Montesano 
v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F.2d 423, 424 (5th Cir. 1987) (following R.A.G.S. but request-
ing its reversal en bane). 
76. 818 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988). 
77. 818 F.2d at 1469. 
78. 818 F.2d at 1469. 
79. 818 F.2d at 1469. Recently, several Ninth Circuit decisions have looked beyond basic 
relatedness and have begun to emphasize the "threat" of continuous behavior. See, e.g., United 
Energy Owners Comm., Inc. v. United States Energy Management Sys., 837 F.2d 356, 360 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (test is "whether the acts posed a threat of continuing activity") (quoting from Sun 
Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 194 (9th Cir. 1987)); Medallion Television Enters. 
v. SelecTV of Calif., 833 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1988),petitionforcert.filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3649 (U.S. 
Mar. 5, 1988) (No. 87-1478) (circumstances of a case must suggest that predicate acts are indica-
tive of a threat of continuing activity). Unfortunately, none of these cases has explained what 
level of activity constitutes a "threat" of further wrongdoing. 
Besides the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit has occasionally applied nothing more than a 
relatedness test. In United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
107 S. Ct. 3230 (1987), the Second Circuit also rejected the continuity requirement, stating that 
"the Sedima footnote does not rise to the level of a holding, [and] is [thus] not controlling." 808 
F.2d at 190. Since Ianniello, however, the Second Circuit has moved away from its expansive 
interpretation of civil RICO claims and has begun to emphasize continuity of conduct in the 
definition of "enterprise." This Circuit thus simultaneously utilizes a broad definition of pattern 
with a requirement that the defendant's "enterprise," as defined in note 13 supra, be continuing. 
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3. The Multi-Factor Approach 
While the above approaches concentrate heavily on the number of 
predicate acts or schemes present, other courts have expanded their 
inquiry beyond such issues. These courts have set forth a variety of 
factors that together contribute to a finding of pattern. The Seventh 
Circuit, in Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 80 has been the major propo-
nent of the multi-factor approach. Although Morgan involved several 
predicate acts within a single grand scheme, the court attempted to 
"steer[ ] a middle course between" the two extremes represented by 
R.A. G.S. and Superior Oil. 81 Stating that "the predicate acts must be 
ongoing over [a measurable] period of time so that they can ... be 
viewed as ... separate transactions," the court identified a number of 
"[r]elevant factors" that could be used to make this determination: 
"the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over 
which they were committed, the number of victims, the presence of 
separate schemes and the occurrence of distinct injuries."82 Because 
the acts of alleged fraud were distinct (relating to the original loan 
transaction and the ensuing foreclosure sale) and "ongoing over ape-
riod of nearly four years," the continuity aspect of the pattern require-
ment was deemed satisfied in Morgan. 83 
Since Morgan, several appellate courts have embraced a multi-
factor approach. 84 In rejecting a bright-line test, these courts have 
abandoned any talismanic reliance on such buzzwords as "schemes" 
and "episodes," and have instead performed a more sophisticated "in-
quiry into the extent of the racketeering activity"85 in each individual 
case. While this case-by-case inquiry has made the interpretive chal-
See Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir. 1988) (pattern established but continuing 
enterprise not found because scheme was "discrete" and "finite"), rehg. en bane granted, Natl. 
L.J., May 9, 1988, at 44, col. 3 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 1988); Creative Bath Prod., Inc. v. Connecticut 
Gen. Life Ins. Co., 837 F.2d 561, 564 (2d Cir. 1988) (continuing enterprise not found because the 
defendant's fraudulent misrepresentations were made in pursuit of a "single short-lived goal"); 
Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 820 F.2d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 1987) (same), cert. denied, 
108 S. Ct. 698 (1988); Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, 831 F.2d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 1987) (continuing 
enterprise not found because complaint "had an obvious terminating goal or date"). In an effort 
to reconcile these confusing interpretations of civil RICO and the pattern requirement, the Sec-
ond Circuit has agreed to rehear the Beauford case en bane. Beauford v. Helmsley, 843 F.2d 103 
(2d Cir. 1988), rehg. en bane granted, Natl. L.J., May 9, 1988 at 44, col. 3 (2d Cir. Mar. 10, 
1988). 
80. 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1986). 
81. 804 F.2d at 975. 
82. 804 F.2d at 975. 
83. 804 F.2d at 976. 
84. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, 832 F.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir. 
1987) ("pattern does not tum on the abstract characterization of ••• acts as 'continuous' and 
'related' but rather on a combination of specific factors"); Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 
819 F.2d 806, 809-10 (7th Cir. 1987) ("'pattern' ... is a fact-specific question encompassing 
many relevant factors"); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 31 (1st Cir. 1987) ("no one 
characteristic can be ••• controlling in determining whether a pattern exists."). 
85. Barticheck, 832 F.2d at 40. 
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lenge posed by section 1961(5) more complex, the end result has been 
a more solidly consistent application of the treble damage remedy 
against those defendants posing the greatest criminal threat. 
Although Sedima cut short several early attempts to restrict civil 
RICO judicially, the situation makes it clear that the courts have 
failed to carry out Sedima's directive to develop a consistent and 
"meaningful" concept of pattern. 86 In fact, all three approaches pro-
posed by the courts suffer from various inadequacies. The approach 
holding that just two related acts are sufficient to form a pattern, cur-
rently in use by the Fifth Circuit (and occasionally invoked by the 
Second and Ninth Circuits), glaringly ignores any requirement of con-
tinuity, thereby disobeying both congressional purpose87 and Sedima's 
mention of continuity. 88 In turn, the multiple schemes approach 
presents courts with a formidable problem of definition and leads to an 
overly restrictive use of the civil RICO remedy.89 Finally, while the 
multiple factors position properly focuses the debate toward con-
tinuity of conduct and recognizes that the pattern riddle cannot be 
solved through reliance on "schemes" or "episodes," the inclusion of 
certain factors (such as the requirement of a separate injury for each 
victim) has clouded the consistency and effectiveness of the standard. 
Ultimately, an analysis of the relevant statutory language, the legisla-
tive history, and the current state of civil RICO abuse suggests that 
focusing on the four key factors best highlighting continuity produces 
86. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. The confusion in the courts has, unfortunately, been mir-
rored by the academic commentary. Compare Moran, The Meaning of Pattern in RICO, 62 
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 139, 158 (1985) ("A pattern consists of two or more predicate acts which are 
related to ... each other, as part of a single scheme which causes injury."), and Note, RICO: 
Limiting Suits By Altering The Pattern, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 177, 204 (1986) {"Congress 
and the courts should adopt a two-part [pattern] analysis, requiring that the predicate acts cause 
separate injuries and also be somewhat separated by time or place."), with Note, Reconsideration 
of Pattern in Civil RICO Offenses, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 83, 96 (1986) {"One definition [of 
pattern] will not do; the definition of pattern must vary according to the [§ 1962] violation al-
leged."). 
This last point, that pattern should mean different things depending upon which § 1962 sub-
section is violated, is most unusual. Absolutely no evidence exists to demonstrate that Congress 
intended a different definition of pattern to apply for each of the three subsections of§ 1962. The 
Senate Report cited in Sedima made no distinction among the three provisions when it noted that 
pattern required "continuity plus relationship." See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158 
cited in Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. Further, § 1962 itself makes no distinction, and in fact 
uses the same language in all three subsections. See note 11 supra for the relevant statutory 
language. Finally, imposing a unique pattern requirement for each § 1962 subsection seems 
pointless, since it has been shown that over 97% of all RICO claims allege a violation of 
§ 1962(c). See A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 57. 
87. See Part III.A infra. 
88. See text accompanying notes 49-51 supra. 
89. The greatest problem with the multiple schemes position, as one court noted, is that 
"defendants who commit a large and ongoing scheme, albeit a single scheme, would automati-
cally escape RICO liability for their acts, an untenable result." Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 
804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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the proper balance between consistent application of the pattern re-
quirement and respect for the legislative intent of RICO. 
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS 
The starting point in any question of statutory interpretation must 
be the actual language of the provision.90 Because the word pattern, 
by itself, defies a precise description,91 RICO's drafters attempted to 
define further the required level of activity sufficient for a pattern. 
Section 1961(5) states that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires 
at least two acts of racketeering activity, ... the last of which occurred 
within ten years ... after the commission of a prior act of racketeering 
activity."92 As has been noted, this definition stands in "contradistinc-
tion"93 to the other definitions in section 1961 "in that it states that a 
pattern 'requires at least two acts'. . . not that it 'means' two such 
· acts."94 Thus, section 1961(5) only establishes a minimum level of re-
quired conduct for RICO liability; a "sufficient" pattern of activity is 
never defined. 95 
Because this definition simply places a floor on the number of pred-
icate acts necessary for a pattern, and does not specifically quantify the 
level of wrongful activity necessary to sustain a RICO conviction, 
courts have differed sharply over the interpretative values of section 
1961(5). Some courts have rejected attempts to narrow the statutory 
definition of pattern, stating instead that the language is "unambigu-
ous. "96 These courts have found no need to inquire into RICO's legis-
lative history or broader policy considerations to support their broad 
interpretation of the pattern requirement. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has indicated that section 1961(5) is vague, noting that "in com-
mon parlance two of anything do not generally form a 'pattern.' "97 
Because of this ambiguity, the Court found it necessary to look to 
other interpretive aids, like the legislative history.98 Still other courts 
have noted that the "common sense interpretation of the word pattern 
90. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., con· 
curring) ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language of 
the statute itself"). 
91. Black's Law Dictionary defines pattern as "[a] reliable sample of traits, acts or other 
observable features characterizing an individual." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1015 (5th ed. 
1979). . 
92. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) (emphasis supplied). See also note 15 supra. 
93. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 193. 
94. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 (emphasis in original). For example,§ 1961's definition of 
"racketeering activity" plainly states what this activity "means," and not merely what is mini· 
mally required. See note 14 supra for statutory language. 
95. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14 ("The implication [of this definition] is that while two 
acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient."). 
96. See, e.g., United States v. DePalma, 461 F. Supp. 778, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 
97. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
98. 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
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implies acts occurring in different criminal episodes," as opposed to 
two or three unrelated acts. 99 
Because of this disagreement over the language of section 1961(5), 
any examination of the pattern requirement must go beyond the "plain 
meaning" of section 1961.100 The plain meaning rule is usually in-
voked in situations where the statutory language is unambiguous. 101 
The obvious inconclusiveness of section 1961(5) indicates that such a 
situation does not exist here. Thus, it is necessary to seek the aid of 
additional rules of statutory construction. One technique of statutory 
interpretation that has been generally accepted, 102 and has even been 
used to interpret RICO's pattern requirement, involves an analysis of 
the use of "pattern" in other federal statutes. In the section defining 
special offenders in Title X of the same Organized Crime Control 
Act, 103 Congress noted that a pattern of criminal conduct is formed 
"if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, . . . or otherwise are . . . not isolated 
events."104 In its message to the lower courts to come up with a more 
consistent definition of pattern, the Sedima Court noted that this sec-
tion could be used as an aid in interpreting RIC0. 105 Taking this lead, 
several courts have analyzed section 3575(e) of Title X and its legisla-
tive history and concluded that it supports a narrow construction of 
pattern in the RICO context.106 In fact, both the multiple schemes 
99. United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57 (D. Conn. 1975) (emphasis in original). See 
also notes 66-70 supra and accompanying text for further discussion of the "different episodes" 
test. 
100. A typical statement of the "plain meaning" rule appears in Caminetti v. United States, 
242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917): "Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning 
the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need 
no discussion." See also Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Inter-
pretation in the Supreme Court, 95 HARv. L. REV. 892 (1982). 
Even if one were to take a "plain meaning" approach to the pattern debate, consider the 
following comment: 
While the statutory definition makes clear that a pattern can consist of only two acts, I 
would have thought the common sense interpretation of the word "pattern" implies acts 
occurring in different criminal episodes .... I would further have thought that the normal 
canon of narrowly construing penal statutes points toward such an interpretation. 
United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 57-58 (D. Conn. 1975) (Newman, J.) (emphasis in 
original). 
101. For a discussion of the plain meaning rule, see Fordham & Leach, Interpretation of 
Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law, 3 V AND. L. REv. 438 (1950). 
102. See, e.g., United States v. Norton, 808 F.2d 908, 910-11 (1st Cir. 1987) (investigating 
other statutory uses of the word "intimidate" to help define same· term in 18 U.S.C. § 844(d)). 
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e), Pub. L. 91-452, 84 Stat. 948 (1970), repealed by Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (effective Nov. 1, 
1987). RICO comprises Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970. See note 1 supra. 
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982). 
105. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
106. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Sav. Assn. v. Touche Ross & Co., 782 F. 2d 966, 
971 (11th Cir. 1986); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252, 256 (8th Cir. 1986); Castle v. 
Cohen, 676 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Pa. 1987), ajfd., 840 F.2d 173 (3d Cir. 1988); Foltz v. U.S. News 
& World Report, Inc., 108 F.R.D. 57, 60 (D.D.C. 1985). 
1762 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 86:1745 
approach and the requirement of related conduct can be traced di-
rectly to this passage in Title X. One court noted that section 3575(e) 
demonstrates that "in enacting RICO Congress intended to reach sep-
arate criminal acts or series of acts that each have the same or a simi-
lar type of purpose, and not acts that have only one and exactly the 
same purpose [singular]."107 While Congress may have been remiss in 
not providing further clarification in RICO's definition of pattern, the 
description of pattern in Title X suggests that both relatedness and 
continuity are important. Since section 3575(e)'s legislative history is 
also replete with references to "professional, long-term criminal ele-
ments in society,"108 the definition of pattern in Title X should be 
given considerable weight in the RICO context as well. 
Title X's definition of pattern, therefore, suggests that some statu-
tory basis exists for interpreting the pattern requirement narrowly. 
While section 1961(5) does not tell us which interpretation of pattern 
is justified, or how many acts (beyond the minimum of two) or sepa-
rate schemes are required, neither can it be said that the section pre-
cludes fashioning a restrictive approach to pattern. Often, the courts 
that reject attempts to limit civil RICO through a narrow construction 
of pattern argue that section 1961(5) does not support such a restric-
tion, since neither "schemes" nor "episodes" appear anywhere in the 
statute. 109 Given the vagueness of section 1961(5), however, this argu-
ment has little force. The lack of statutory precision requires courts to 
look for guidance beyond the particular wording of the statute. 
In the effort to flesh out the best interpretation of pattern, courts 
will have to include guidelines to insure that consistent interpretations 
of the pattern requirement are rendered. Because of the ambiguity of 
section 1961(5), these guidelines must derive from sources outside the 
language. Thus, a "plain meaning" approach to this problem of lin-
guistic construction is not helpful and recourse to both the legislative 
history and the problems plaguing civil RICO's current application is 
necessary. 110 
107. Castle, 676 F. Supp. at 630 (emphasis in original) (using § 3575(e) to support multiple 
schemes approach). 
108. Superior Oil, 785 F.2d at 257 n.7 (summarizing§ 3575(e)'s legislative history). See also 
Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st. cOng., 2d Sess. 245 (1970) [hereinafter House Hearings] 
(statement of Assistant Attorney GeneraJ Wilson) (The "pattern of conduct" requirement 
"would not be just another bribery count or something of that nature. It would be continuous 
conduct like that of a major bookie operating over a long period of time."). 
109. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184, 192 & n.15 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3230 (1987); FDIC v. Kerr, 637 F. Supp. 828, 835 (W.D.N.C. 1986). 
110. See, e.g., Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972) ("But, while the 
clear meaning of statutory language is not to be ignored, 'words are inexact tools at best,' and 
hence it is essential that we place the words of a statute in their proper context by resort to the 
legislative history.") (quoting Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479 (1943)), 
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III. Two JUSTIFICATIONS FOR INTERPRETING THE PATTERN 
REQUIREMENT NARROWLY 
Comparing what RICO's drafters intended for the statute with 
what private litigants and federal courts have subsequently allowed to 
happen sheds considerable light on how the pattern requirement 
should be interpreted today. A liberal construction of pattern would 
contradict the intent to limit civil RICO to professional criminals and 
repeat offenders and result in a continuation of the broad and unwar-
ranted use of the statute. A narrow interpretation, however, would 
refocus and redirect civil RICO prosecutions towards those criminals 
who commonly violate the statute's predicate offenses. 
A. Congressional Intentions for RICO and the Pattern Requirement 
1. RICO's Prime Goal: Attacking the Economic Base 
of Organized Crime 
Although the legislative history of RICO is well documented, no 
consensus has been reached as to exactly what type of behavior Con-
gress wished to proscribe. Some commentators have concluded that 
Congress intended RICO as a specific response to the problem of crim-
inal infiltration of legitimate businesses, 111 while others have uncov-
ered much broader purposes from the legislative history.112 
Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, however, most ob-
servers generally agree that the major thrust behind Title IX was not 
so much the eradication of all organized crime, but rather the minimi-
zation of organized crime influence and control over legitimate 
businesses.113 
RICO was originally enacted as a response to studies that had 
demonstrated the extent to which organized crime had penetrated a 
wide range of legitimate businesses114 from jukebox sales to securities 
firms. 115 In light of these findings, a key Senate proponent stated that 
RICO's principal aim was to "prevent organized criminals from infil-
111. See, e.g., Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 low A 
L. REv. 837, 84().45, 892 (1980). 
112. See, e.g., Blakey & Goldstock, "On the Watelfront'': RICO and Labor Racketeering, 17 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (1980). 
113. See Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & Il 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
661, 664 (1987) (also arguing that fashioning a broad, overly remedial purpose from RICO's 
legislative history is unwarranted). 
114. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967); Organized Crime and 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotics: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the 
Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-35 (1963) (statement of Attor-
ney General Robert F. Kennedy). 
115. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 76 ("In most cities, organized crime now 
dominates the fields of jukebox and vending machine distribution."); id. at 77 ("It is most dis-
turbing ..• to learn that organized crime has begun to penetrate securities firms and the Stock 
Exchange itself."). 
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trating legitimate commercial organizations with the proceeds of their 
criminal activities . . . and to remove them and their influence from 
such enterprises once they have been in:filtrated.''116 
Because the presence of organized crime was so widespread in le-
gitimate enterprises, Congress needed a statute that would target the 
specific conduct in which ci;ime syndicates were customarily en-
gaged.117 But because of the constitutional prohibitions against pun-
ishing mere status, 118 Congress could not explicitly require the statute 
to reach only members of the Mafia. Consequently, the legislature 
drafted the language broadly.119 In fact, the drafters were quite con-
cerned that restrictive language could be used to escape criminal liabil-
ity, and the operative statutory language was drafted broadly to 
prevent this. Congress noted that "organized crime continues to grow 
because [the] defects in the evidence-gathering process ... inhibit[ ] 
the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring 
criminal ... sanctions ... to bear [against] those engaged in organized 
crime.''120 Defining "organized crime," or even the types of acts en-
gaged in by organized criminals, is difficult, and the drafters kept the 
language intentionally broad to prevent criminal litigants from discov-
ering and abusing any loopholes. 
116. House Hearings, supra note 108, at 106 (statement of Senator McClellan); see also note 2 
supra; United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 591 (1981) ("[T]he major purpose of[RICO) is to 
address the infiltration of legitimate business by organized crime."). For an excellent survey of 
RICO's legislative history, see Lynch, supra note 113, at 666-84 (1987). 
117. Congress stated that "organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, 
diversified, and widespread activity that •.. derives a major portion of its power through money 
obtained . . . from ... illegal endeavors •.• this money and power are increasingly used to 
infiltrate and corrupt legitimate businesses and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our 
democratic processes .... " "Statement of Findings and Purpose" accompanying the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970), reprinted in 1970 
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMlN. NEWS 1073. 
118. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, (1962). See also Lynch, RICO: The Crime of 
Being a Criminal, Parts Ill & JV, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 920, 956 (1987) ("It is not a crime ••• to 
have the character or status of a racketeer, but to be a racketeer who commits acts of racketeer-
ing.") (emphasis in original). 
119. See Note, Civil RICO Is a Misnomer: The Need for Criminal Procedural Protections In 
Actions Under 18 U.S.C. § 1964, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1288, 1299 (1987) ("Congress was forced to 
make RICO as substantively broad as it did in part by its realization that a status-based statute 
would likely be unconstitutional."). 
120. Statement of Findings and Purpose, Organized Crime Control Act, Pub. L. 91-452, 84 
Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970). In order to give greater force to this intent, Congress added a provision 
that mandated that RICO's provisions "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial 
purposes." Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947. Some 
have argued that this liberal construction clause prohibits courts from construing the pattern 
requirement narrowly. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1031-33 
(1980); Note, RICO and the Liberal Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 167 (1980). Yet 
the provision itself refers to RICO's overall remedial purposes, which were to combat the in-
creasing influence of organized crime. The clause should not be used as a crutch to support a 
prosecution in every instance of mail and wire fraud, especially given the fact that civil RICO 
was passed after the liberal construction clause was inserted. See notes 134-39 Infra and accom-
panying text. 
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In addition to preventing loopholes, RICO's creators were con-
cerned with attacking the economic base of structured criminality.121 
To effect this, wire, mail and securities fraud were added as predicate 
violations to prevent the illicit and economically harmful infiltration of 
legitimate business by organized crime.122 Further, a new remedy, 
criminal forfeiture, was added to the statute to deter criminal activity. 
This prosecutorial weapon compelled the forfeiture of assets used in 
connection with or derived from criminal enterprises. Criminal forfei-
ture provided an imposing supplement to the other traditional "eco-
nomic" remedies, such as divestment and dissolution.123 
While RICO's framers intended to provide the government with 
the full panoply of criminal and civil remedies for use in the fight 
against organized criminal influence, RICO's extension beyond "struc-
tured criminal enterprises was intended to be incidental."124 In order 
to limit RICO's application to structured criminality, the sponsors of 
the final Senate bill included the "pattern of racketeering" and "enter-
prise" elements as additional requirements. Senator McClellan, the 
major RICO proponent in the Senate, later emphasized that an indi-
vidual had not only to commit RICO predicate violations, but to 
"continually engage" in a pattern of such violations so as to obtain an 
interest in an interstate business.125 If these requirements were not 
met, then true racketeering activity was not present and the defendant 
was not subject to the penalties of Title IX.126 
For McClellan and the other Senate RICO supporters, the type of 
conduct that best characterized the true racketeer was planned, ongo-
ing, and continuing illegal activity. As the Senate noted: "Title IX .. . 
is based upon the judgment that parties who conduct organizations .. . 
through a pattern of criminal activity are acting contrary to the public 
interest. To protect the public, these individuals must be prohibited 
from continuing to engage in this type of activity .... " 127 Given this 
goal, the "pattern of racketeering activity" requirement became the 
centerpiece of the statute. Although the legislators wanted to draft a 
121. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 79. 
122. In the original bill introduced by Senator McClellan, RICO's predicate violations did 
not include wire, mail, or securities fraud. However, based on concerns expressed by the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission that organized crime was engaged in the sale of stolen or counter-
feit securities, the list of predicate acts was expanded during Committee consideration to include 
mail and wire fraud, and fraud in the sale of securities. See A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra 
note 70, at 99 n.130. 
123. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962, 1963; see also 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 79 (dis-
cussing new remedies). For an analysis of RICO's criminal forfeiture provision, see Russello v. 
United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983). 
124. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 124. 
125. See McClellan, The Organized Crime Control Act (S.30) or Its Critics: Which Threatens 
Civil Liberties?, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 55, 144 (1970). 
126. Id. 
127. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 82. 
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statute broad enough to cover the traditional racketeer, there was con-
cern that innocent businessmen would be harassed by an all-encom-
passing statute.128 To ensure that RICO would only be used against 
the continuing offender, the Senate Judiciary Committee noted: 
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute. One 
isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the 
remedies provided ... largely because the net would be too large and the 
remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the offense. The target of 
title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate busi-
ness normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the 
threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity 
plus relationship which combines to produce a pattem.129 
In addition to this report, Representative Poff, a major sponsor of the 
House bill, stated that the pattern requirement meant "at least two 
independent offenses forming a pattern of conduct."130 
The broad goals of RICO and the design of the pattern require-
ment reveal that only those criminals who committed the multiple, 
independent offenses necessary to infiltrate a legitimate business were 
meant to bear civil RICO's harsh penalties. This goal is often ignored 
by courts, however, because the judiciary is faced with the contradic-
tory task of reconciling RICO's broad language and liberal construc-
tion clause131 with this narrow legislative goal, which clearly targets a 
specific criminal problem. Theoretically, a broad definition of "infil-
tration" or "enterprise" could result in a statute that punishes anyone 
who commits acts that an organized criminal might commit when cor-
rupting a legitimate institution. Some have argued that RICO's broad 
language mandates such a result. 132 Construing RICO to reach all 
types of traditional fraud cases, however, merely exacerbates the 
problems of an obviously poorly drafted statute. Because Congress 
originally created the broad language to strike an economic blow 
against the varied illegal methods of a nationwide criminal syndi-
cate, 133 using civil RICO's penalties in every instance of commercial 
fraud today warps the goals of a statute that was meant to target the 
more professional offender. 
128. In their condemnation of the overall bill, Representatives Conyers, Mikva, and Ryan 
stated that RICO "provides invitation for disgruntled and malicious competitors to harass inno· 
cent businessmen .•.. A competitor need only raise the claim that his rival has derived gains 
from two [predicate acts] ... and ... litigation is begun. What a protracted, expensive trial may 
not succeed in doing, the adverse publicity may well accomplish - destruction of the rival's 
business." H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE 
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4083. 
129. 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158. This oft-cited quote was used by the 
Sedima Court in its discussion of the pattern requirement. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 496 n.14. 
130. 116 CONG. REc. 35,193 (1970) (remarks by Rep. Poll) (emphasis added). 
131. See note 120 supra. 
132. See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, supra note 120. 
133. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 525 (Powell, J., dissenting) (legislative history makes clear that 
the statute was intended to be applied primarily against organized crime). 
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2. Implications of the Private Attorney General Provision 
A second reason for interpreting the pattern requirement narrowly 
derives from the fact that the private remedy, section 1964(c), was 
added to Title IX at the last minute, with very little debate or consid-
eration of the possible consequences of a "private attorney general" 
provision. While the proposed provisions relating to governmental 
prosecutions were extensively surveyed, the bill that passed the Senate 
mentioned nothing about a private remedy.134 The decision to add the 
treble damage provision was made by a House subcommittee135 and 
was debated only briefly.136 When the House passed the slightly 
amended S.30 without even a conference, Senator McClellan described 
the House amendment as a "minor change[ ]."137 
As Judge Oakes noted in the Second Circuit's Sedima decision, 138 
the last-minute addition of a private treble damage remedy "indicates 
that Congress did not intend [section 1964(c)] to have the extraordi-
nary impact claimed for it. Indeed, ... [t]he most important and evi-
dent conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history is that 
Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 
1964(c)."139 
When one considers how commercial fraud offenses140 have come 
to serve as the basis for a vast majority of section 1964(c) filings, 141 the 
implications of this last-minute addition are significant. Originally, se-
curities fraud was added to the list of RICO predicate violations be-
cause organized criminal syndicates had begun to infiltrate the 
securities industry.142 Because the mail and telephone wires are obvi-
ously common tools used in the perpetration of this and other fraudu-
134. The "[c]ivil remedies," discussed in the 1969 Senate Report, referred solely to the Gov-
ernment's right to seek and obtain injunctions for divestment, restraints on future activities, and 
orders of dissolution for violations of section 1962. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 
24. When S. 30 finally passed the Senate in early 1970 by a vote of 73-1, it contained no private 
treble damage remedy. See 116 CoNG. REc. 972 (1970). 
135. Originally, the idea of incorporating a private, treble damage remedy into the Senate bill 
came from the ABA Board of Governers. See House Hearings, supra note 108, at 543-44; see also 
note 144 infra. This proposal was then suggested to the House Judiciary Committee by Rep. 
Steiger. See House Hearings, supra note 108, at 518-20 (proposal of a civil damage remedy by 
Rep. Steiger). 
136. For a discussion of how briefthe discussion over§ 1964(c) was, see Judge Oakes's deci-
sion in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 488-92 (2d Cir. 1984), revd, 473 U.S. 479 
(1985). 
137. 116 CONG. REC. 36,293 (1970). 
138. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). 
139. 741 F.2d at 490, 492. 
140. This term is meant to encompass mail, wire and securities fraud, the major racketeering 
offenses listed in § 1961(1). For a discussion of§ 1961, see note 14 supra. 
141. See Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study, supra note 16, at 620-21. 
142. See A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 100-02; note 122 supra. See also 
Note, RICO and Securities Fraud: A Workable Limitation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1513, 1514-17 
(1983). 
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lent schemes, mail fraud and wire fraud were added as well. Yet the 
inclusion of these activities occurred before the addition of the private 
remedy, when Congress was concerned with providing the govern-
ment (and not private litigants) with broad economic weapons to use 
against those who corrupted legitimate enterprises. While this does 
not mean that the private remedy should never apply to the commer-
cial fraud offenses, no evidence exists to show that Congress intended 
for treble recovery every time a violation occurred that was of a type 
associated with organized crime.143 Thus, rather than constituting a 
dramatic expansion of the enforcement of the federal fraud laws, the 
inclusion of a private cause of action should merely be seen as provid-
ing an additional weapon to use against the corrupt infiltration of le-
gitimate commercial activities by organized crime.144 
RICO's legislative history does not definitively answer the question 
of how best to apply the pattern requirement. However, several facets 
of this history should be kept in mind when considering the proper 
application of the statute. The first and most important factor to con-
sider should be the congressional desire to stem the increasing infiltra-
tion of legitimate enterprises by illicit activity.145 This desire must be 
the driving force behind the interpretation of both the criminal and 
civil components of the statute. Indeed, given that the private remedy 
received only cursory debate, consideration of this goal in the context 
of civil RICO assumes even greater importance. Second, the legisla-
tive history evinces a serious concern for the continuing offender.146 
Despite RICO's sweeping language, Congress intended for all RICO 
defendants to meet several statutory requirements, since mere mem-
bership in "La Cosa Nostra" was not enough to trigger RICO liabil-
ity.147 Consequently, Congress placed a "pattern of racketeering 
activity requirement" in the statute to identify a particular type of of-
fender, the true racketeer.148 Because these racketeers engage in 
planned, ongoing criminal activity rather than sporadic and isolated 
episodes of crime, the patterri element of the statute should be nar-
rowly interpreted to target this type of prolonged criminal conduct. 
143. See Terra Resources I v. Burgin, 664 F. Supp. 82, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("there is no 
evidence that it was ever the intent of Congress to flood the federal courts with actions more 
properly brought under various state and other federal statutes in the name of RICO simply 
because of the carrot of treble recovery"); A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 125 
(Congress never stipulated that section 1964(c) should replace existing federal and state fraud 
remedies). 
144. In its recommendation to Congress, the ABA noted that the private remedy would "be 
a major tool in extirpating the baneful influence of organized crime in our economic life." 116 
CoNG. REc. 25,190 (1970). See also note 135 supra (discussing the ABA proposal). 
145. See notes 113-16 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text. 
147. See notes 118-19 supra. 
148. This conclusion as to the legislative history was also reached by the 1985 Ad Hoc Civil 
RICO Task Force. See A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 123-24. 
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B. Current RICO Abuse and the Importance of a Narrow 
Construction of Pattern 
1769 
Even though the legislative history suggests that RICO's applica-
bility should be limited to the type of ongoing illegal activity associ-
ated with professional criminals, the current scope of civil RICO 
litigation has gone far beyond this goal. In 1985, the American Bar 
Association's Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force reported that 40% of 
civil RICO filings alleged securities fraud as the underlying predicate 
act, and an additional 37% involved allegations of common law fraud 
in a commercial setting.149 A more recent survey shows that common 
law fraud constitutes the underlying dispute in almost 55% of all 
RICO claims, whereas securities fraud has dropped to 28.8%. 150 By 
contrast, only 9% of the hundreds of civil RICO filings involved 
claims based on predicate offenses commonly associated with "profes-
sional criminal type activity"151 something more than standard com-
mercial fraud. Today, RICO claims are being filed in almost every 
dispute involving a commercial transaction.152 RICO filings have 
149. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 55-56. This Report was cited by both 
the majority and the dissent in Sedima as evidence of the abuse and unintended direction of civil 
RICO. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499 n.16, 526-27. 
150. Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study, supra note 16, at 621. This drop in securities fraud 
cases under RICO will probably continue as a result of the Supreme Court's recent decision in 
Shearson/ American Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). There, the plaintiff sued his 
broker, alleging violations of§ lO(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and § 1964(c) 
under RICO. Because the customer agreement between the parties had provided for arbitration 
of any controversy relating to the account, the defendant moved to compel the court to stay its 
proceedings pending arbitration of both the§ lO(b) and the RICO claims. Rejecting the argu-
ment that RICO claims are not arbitrable, Justice O'Connor stated that defendants could "effec-
tively vindicate their RICO claim in an arbitral forum • . . . Moreover, nothing in RICO's text or 
legislative history .•• demonstrates congressional intent to make an exception to the Arbitration 
Act for RICO claims." 107 S. Ct. at 2345-46. 
As arbitration clauses have become standard practice in the contracts between customers and 
brokers, the number of securities fraud RICO cases brought in federal district courts should 
decline. See Innovative Use of Civil RICO Promises To Continue in 1988, 3 Civ. RICO Rep. 
(BNA) No. 33, at 4, 5 (Jan. 26, 1988) (arguing that "RICO cases based on predicate acts of 
securities fraud .•. should fall off significantly"). Partially as a result of this decision, the securi-
ties industry, who before had been outspoken critics of civil RICO, has toned down its objections 
and lobbying efforts. 
The need for clarification of the pattern requirement, however, will not be lessened, and may 
even be heightened, by this decision. Regardless of the forum in which these RICO claims are 
decided (arbitration vs. courts), the need to pinpoint the level of activity necessary to incur RICO 
liability remains as strong as ever. Indeed, if many RICO cases do move to arbitration, there will 
be fewer chances to develop and debate the pattern concept, since arbitral decisions will not 
contain extensive discussions of the relevant case law. Further, even if these claims are decided 
by arbitration, the right of appeal to the federal judiciary will still be in force. Consequently, the 
need for a consistent definition of pattern on the federal level remains unchanged by Shearson/ 
American Express. 
151. Both the 1986 figures in the Blakey article and the figures compiled for the 1985 report 
of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force found that 91 % of the allegations in civil RICO claims 
did not involve "'professional criminal type' activity." See Blakey & Cessor, RICO Case Study, 
supra note 16, at 619; A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 56. 
152. See generally Boucher, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima, 31 
N.Y. L. See. L. REv. 133, 140-141 (1986) (pointing out the diverse reach of RICO claims). 
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been included in litigation over takeover battles, 153 landlord-tenant 
disputes, 154 and matrimonial controversies.155 
There are several reasons for RICO's expanding scope.156 First, 
the breadth of RICO's language, including such a diverse array of 
common offenses, practically invites a litigation explosion. The poten-
tial of treble recovery and the inclusion of mail, wire and securities 
fraud as predicate "racketeering" acts157 also make it very tempting to 
include a RICO claim in any fraud dispute. "In view of the use of the 
mails and the telephone in virtually every business transaction," one 
Congressman has noted that "the private right of action under RICO 
effectively encompasses the universe of commercial disputes." 158 In-
deed, it is so easy and tempting to allege a RICO claim that counsel 
may commit malpractice if a RICO claim is not made when the sec-. 
tion 1962 statutory elements have been satisfied.159 
A second reason why plaintiffs find RICO attractive can be found 
in the statute's procedural rules, which not only contain liberal venue 
and service of process provisions, but allow very broad discovery as 
well. 160 For plaintiff corporations who are suing competitor corpora-
tions, such wide discovery can often yield valuable information. 161 In 
addition, including RICO claims usually raises the pressure to settle 
these vexatious suits, because the defendant's fear of being labelled a 
Boucher is a Virginia Congressman who has introduced legislation aimed at curtailing the reach 
of civil RICO. See H.R. 5445, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H9366 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 
1986). The House passed H.R. 5445 on October 7, 1986, but the Senate narrowly defeated the 
bill on October 18, 1986. See RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 11 6041.50. (1987); for a further 
discussion of H.R. 5445, see note 233 infra and for a discussion of other pending RICO legisla-
tion, see notes 233-38 infra and accompanying text. 
153. E.g., Warner Co=unications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Del. 1984) 
(hostile takeover target unsuccessfully alleged that its corporate adversary violated § 1961(5)), 
154. E.g., Pit Pros, Inc. v. Wolf, 554 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (tenant alleged that land-
lord misrepresented zoning class of apartment). 
155. E.g., Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1198,772 
(E.D. Pa. 1982), dismissed, 109 F.2d 1491 (3d Cir. 1983) (wife claimed ex-husband defrauded her 
of interest in jointly owned stock). 
156. In early 1986, the National Law Journal indicated that as many as 10% of newly filed 
federal claims contain RICO counts. Lauter & Strasser, The Year in Review, 1985 - Civil 
RICO, Natl. L.J., Dec. 30, 1985/Jan. 6. 1986, at s-9, col. 1. 
157. For relevant statutory language, see note 14 supra. 
158. Boucher, supra note 152, at 140. 
159. See Block, Donovan, Reeves & Wilson, What Are the Ethical Considerations in Alleging 
Civil RICO?, in 1 A.B.A., RICO: THE ULTIMATE WEAPON IN BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL 
LmGATION F-1, at 3 (1983) ("[T)he express civil remedy under RICO may become ••• a legal 
imperative .••. "). 
160. This condition results from access to federal jurisdiction and from RICO's specific pro-
visions relating to venue and nationwide service of process. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (1982). See 
also note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
161. "[T)he very breadth and vagueness of the RICO statute suggests that ••• a defendant 
may be exposed to pretrial discovery of every aspect of its business for a ten-year period." Spen-
cer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 1198,361, 
at 92,217 (C.D. Mass. 1981). 
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"racketeer" gives added bargaining leverage to the plaintiffs.162 
While the scope of civil RICO may not have reached the "out of 
control" stage that some have suggested, 163 it is clear that civil RICO 
has had unexpectedly and perhaps undesirably broad effects, especially 
in the past several years. 164 Indeed, the Court noted in Sedima that 
"in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something quite 
different from the original conception of its enactors."165 Although 
originally intending to cripple organized crime, Congress has unwit-
tingly contributed to the "[t]houghtless increase in federal jurisdic-
tion."166 In 1985-1986, 41.4% of all RICO filings contained no 
grounds for federal jurisdiction other than section 1962.167 Thus, by 
following congressional intent and limiting civil RICO to true continu-
ing offenders, courts could cut hundreds of cases from the federal 
docket each year. 
While the evidence concerning legislative intent and subsequent 
abuse strongly suggest that civil RICO should be restricted, the proper 
role of the courts in this question is somewhat controversial. Some 
have asserted that the judiciary should be precluded from restricting 
civil RICO in any way, instead arguing that this task should lie with 
Congress. 168 While congressional action may be the ultimate way to 
correct the problems with civil RICO's application, the failure of the 
162. See RICO Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Just. of the House Comm. 
of the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 902 (1985) (statement of Rep. Boucher) ("For a 
small business person whose livelihood is largely dependent upon his reputation in the commu-
nity, being named as a racketeer in a RICO civil suit can be particularly devastating."); id., pt. 1, 
at 527 (statement of Circuit Judge Abner J. Mikva) ("often [a civil RICO claim's] sole effect is 
intended to or at least has the effect of pressing the other side into a settlement"); see also 
Strasser, Prosecutors, Private Bar Find New Uses far RICO, Natl. L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, at 18, col. 1 
(acknowledging same pressure). 
163. See, e.g., Berg & Zelikow, The RICO Statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968: The Business 
Client as Racketeer, 45 TEXAS B.J. 159, 164 (1986) (also comparing RICO to the "notorious 
Article 58 in the Soviet criminal code"). 
164. "Since 1982, the number of civil [RICO] suits ... has more than quadrupled." N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 24, 1986, at Al 7, col. 1, 3. See also Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 766 (1985) (statement of the American 
Property and Casualty Ins. Indus. delivered by Irvin B. Nathan) ("hundreds of ..• civil RICO 
actions have been brought in circumstances that [do not] ••• involve ..• allegations of serious 
business misconduct"). But see Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO Abuse.· The A/legations in Con-
text, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 55, 71-84 (arguing that RICO has not been abused to excess and that 
vigorous enforcement remedies exist to combat any abuse); Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study, 
supra note 16, at 534 n.29 (district court concern over RICO case flood is misplaced). Professor 
Blakey points out that, of the total federal filings each year, RICO claims would not exceed 
5,000, or 2% of the total. Id. Regardless of the number, however, it is the type of defendant that 
is being sued, not the total number of filings, that is representative of RICO abuse. 
165. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. 
166. Feinberg, The Coming Deterioration of the Federal Judiciary, 42 THE REc. 179, 182 
(1987). See also Terra Resources Iv. Burgin, 664 F. Supp. 82, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (applying 
Judge Feinberg's quote to the abuses of civil RICO). 
167. Blakey & Cessar, RICO Cose Study, supra note 16, at 619. 
168. See, e.g., Note, The Conflict over RICO's Private Treble Damages Action, 10 CoRNELL 
L. REV. 902 (1985). 
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judiciary "to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern' " 169 has cer-
tainly contributed to the abuse of the statute. Interpreting the pattern 
requirement narrowly represents the best and, after Sedima, perhaps 
the only way for the courts to remedy this unfortunate contribution. 
Thus, by developing a consistent definition of pattern, the courts could 
both curb some of the abuses and restrict civil RICO to its intended 
focus. 
IV. DEVELOPING A "MEANINGFUL CONCEPT": A MULTI-
FACTOR Focus ON CONTINUITY 
A survey of RICO's legislative history demonstrates that the in-
tended targets of the statute were those offenders who committed mul-
tiple and continuing offenses. The pattern requirement was inserted in 
the statute to so limit RICO. An examination of the subsequent case 
law, however, illustrates that RICO has been used in many unexpected 
areas. This has occurred mostly because of the failure of the courts to 
apply the key pattern requirement consistently and meaningfully. In 
trying to rectify this situation:, courts should strive for both consis-
tency and a way to decrease RICO's expanding applications. This can 
be accomplished by focusing the pattern requirement on the criminals 
who commonly commit true racketeering crimes and who pose the 
greatest threat to legitimate enterprises. With these goals in mind, the 
multiple factor approach emerges as the optimal solution because it 
provides a comprehensive and consistent framework for pinpointing 
the continuing offender. By defining and then applying the four fac-
tors necessary to establish continuity, this section will demonstrate 
how a sophisticated inquiry into illicit conduct can result in the appli-
cation of the treble damage remedy against those who most deserve 
the penalty. 
A. Goals of an Optimal Pattern Requirement 
In developing a meaningful definition of pattern, courts should be 
guided by two basic goals: a respect for congressional intent and con-
sistency of application. These goals should be emphasized because the 
judicial treatment of RICO demonstrates that congressional intent has 
been largely ignored in the morass of inconsistent and unpredictable 
pattern cases. An optimal approach to pattern, therefore, will have to 
return RICO to its intended focus (by emphasizing relationship and 
continuity) and provide the courts with enough direction so that the 
current inconsistencies are avoided. 
As to the first goal, the Senate specifically mentioned relationship 
and continuity when drafting the pattern requirement because it felt 
169. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 500. 
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that isolated conduct should not merit RICO's penalties.17° By ensur-
ing that a defendant's recurring acts bear some relationship to the 
plaintiff's injury, Congress hoped to eliminate the insidious influence 
of structured criminality as opposed to the effects of isolated activity. 
While many courts have successfully developed a workable test for 
relatedness, the more important continuity prong has proved far more 
difficult to define. 
With respect to "relationship," most courts have articulated a test 
that closely parallels the definition of pattern in Title X. 171 These 
courts have taken Sedima's directive that this section "may be useful" 
in interpreting pattern and concluded that "similar purposes, results, 
. . . victims and methods of commission" in the perpetration of a 
fraudulent scheme present evidence of an adequate relationship. 172 
Often, if a RICO injury results from two or more acts of racketeering 
activity, the plaintiff can show the requisite relationship between the 
acts simply by demonstrating that both acts were directed at the plain-
tiff. Thus, while two or three acts of mail fraud should not be enough 
to satisfy the continuity prong, demonstrating that the acts had similar 
purposes or were part of a common scheme (i.e., were related) gener-
ally does not prove difficult for the civil RICO litigant. 
Proving the continuity element, however, should remain difficult 
for the RICO plaintiff.173 Concentrating the pattern inquiry on pro-
longed criminal behavior constitutes the best way to achieve a key 
congressional goal: the limitation of treble fines to the true racketeer, 
"a person who commonly commits such [racketeering] crimes.''174 
Unfortunately, while continuity may have been the concept that most 
concerned Congress, it is also the one that causes much of the present 
confusion. Any approach to defining pattern, therefore, will have to 
go beyond merely recognizing the importance of prolonged criminal 
behavior;175 courts will have to provide a sophisticated and workable 
170. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158. 
171. See 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982); see also notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text for a 
closer analysis of§ 3575(e). 
172. Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., 770 F.2d 717, 718 n.l (8th Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986). Other courts have developed a quite similar description of related-
ness by requiring "that the racketeering acts [be] connected with each other by some common 
scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts." 
Berg v. First Am. Bankshares, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.D.C. 1984), ajfd., 196 F.2d 489 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
173. Some courts do not even recognize the importance of continuity of conduct, preferring 
instead to focus solely on relatedness. See, e.g., California Architectural Bldg. Prods. v. Francis-
can Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 698 (1988) 
(rejecting continuity requirement because "RICO defines 'pattern of racketeering activity' with-
out mentioning continuity"). See also cases discussed in Part I.B.2 supra. 
174. A.B.A. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 70, at 207-08. 
175. For an example of a case that recognizes the importance of continuity but does not 
provide a framework for defining it, see Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841 F.2d 531, 538 
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting that defendant's conduct must be "extended, widespread or particularly 
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framework for defining continuity. The multi-factor approach sug-
gested by this Note provides a rigorous examination of continuity and 
will allow the pattern requirement to perform the role it was intended 
to play - "focus the statute on continuing transgressors who pose the 
greatest threat to society."176 
A second goal that an optimal interpretation of pattern should 
achieve is consistent and predictable application. The present situa-
tion of inter- and intra-circuit conflict cannot be allowed to continue. 
Not only do the approaches to pattern differ markedly among the fed-
eral courts,177 but inconsistency prevails even within the application of 
the "multiple schemes" and "different episodes" approaches. A major 
problem with the current "schemes" and "episodes" tests is that a 
consistent definition of these buzzwords has never been developed.178 
Some courts seem to treat an episode as almost equivalent to a single 
act of racketeering activity,179 while others view an episode as an en-
tirely separate commercial transaction encompassing several acts. 180 
Similarly, some courts have defined a scheme to encompass any one 
type of criminal activity, 181 whereas other courts have required "some 
kind of far ranging, multi-act criminal plot."182 Thus, the inherent 
difficulties of applying these one-word interpretations of pattern has 
led to inconsistency and, even worse, unpredictability. Similar con-
duct should receive similar punishment, and the unpredictable appli-
cation of the pattern requirement merely furthers the abuses 
documented above. The prospect of every commercial establishment 
in the nation wondering whether its one-dimensional dispute will trig-
ger RICO liability is entirely unacceptable. 
Using these goals as basic guidelines for defining pattern, only one 
of the approaches currently used by the appellate courts comes close 
to meeting the interpretive challenge posed by section 1961(5). The 
multi-factor approach provides the best solution to the pattern riddle 
because it recognizes that section 1961(5) cannot be interpreted by us-
ing such conclusory but no~defining terms as "schemes" or "epi-
sodes." In addition, the multi-factor approach recognizes, unlike the 
dangerous" to constitute a pattern but providing little guidance on what these terms mean). For 
similarly conclusory language, see the Ninth Circuit cases described in note 79 supra. 
176. Mathews & Weissman, New Cottage Industry: Interpreting RICO's "Pattern" Require-
ment, 1 INSIDE LmGATION 17, 23 (Mar. 1987). 
177. See Part I supra. 
178. For further criticism of the multiple schemes approach, see note 89 supra and accompa· 
nying text. 
179. See, e.g., Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1412-13 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
180. See, e.g., Grant v. Union Bank, 629 F. Supp. 570, 577-78 (D. Utah 1986). 
181. See, e.g. Johnson v. Schopf, 669 F. Supp. 291, 294 (D. Minn. 1987). 
182. Roberts v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 653 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Mass. 1986) 
(characterizing the definition of scheme in Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 
1986)). 
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two-acts-are-sufficient standard, 183 that continuity of conduct is a vital 
barometer of the type of behavior Congress intended RICO to pro-
scribe. Although this section will propose a different and streamlined 
set of factors than courts currently use when measuring continuity, the 
basic notion of examining several facets of the defendant's criminal 
activity "strikes an appropriate balance between RICO's role as a flex-
ible tool for discouraging criminal activity and the danger of allowing 
it to reach sporadic and isolated criminal activities."184 
B. Factors Evincing Continuity 
A properly conceived multi-factor approach attempts to remove 
from the pattern debate such conclusory terms as schemes and epi-
sodes, and replace them with a more comprehensive analysis that an-
swers the questions those tests were also posing: Does the civil RICO 
defendant demonstrate a practice of criminal activity and commonly 
commit such crimes? In the early, post-Sedima stages of the pattern 
debate, when courts were trying to stem the tide of civil RICO abuse, 
the schemes/episodes tests were useful counterweights to the prevail-
ing view that any two related predicate acts constituted a pattern. 
Generally, this contrast is still helpful since the approach solely em-
phasizing relatedness blatantly ignores Sedima's mention of con-
tinuity. But as the number of pattern cases has risen, and as the 
debate has grown increasingly complex and sophisticated, it is time to 
acknowledge that continuity must involve a factually oriented stan-
dard instead of a set rule. 185 The following four factors, some already 
in use by the courts and some not, would most effectively help the 
judiciary determine what constitutes continuous criminal behavior. 
1. Number of Independent Victims 
Frequently, a civil RICO claim will derive from a commercial dis-
pute (usually fraud), 186 and the number of victims injured in this dis-
pute can often suggest differences about the extent of the defendant's 
activity. The presence of multiple victims usually connotes an activity 
183. See Part I.C.2 supra. 
184. Roberts, 653 F. Supp. at 412. 
185. Some courts have argued that a factually oriented test would lead to even more inconsis-
tency. See Papai v. Cremosnik, 635 F. Supp. 1402, 1410 (N.D. ID. 1986) (also characterizing the 
multi-factor approach to defining pattern as similar to Justice Stewart's "I know it when I see it" 
test for obscenity articulated in his concurrence in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)). 
Recently, however, other courts have come to the realization that a detailed, multifaceted inquiry 
into continuity represents the most effective way to respond to Sedima's dictum. See Robinson v. 
Kidder Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243, 245 (E.D. Mich. 1987), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 
1127 (6th Cir. 1988) ("in the wake of Sedima it is clear that a case-by-case analysis of the facts in 
each case is appropriate to a determination of whether the 'pattern' requirement has been satis-
factorily pleaded"). 
186. See Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study, supra note 16, at 621 (in 1986, 54.9% of RICO 
cases involved "common law fraud"). 
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that has been repeated.187 Where these victims were separate purchas-
ers or suffered distinct injuries, the activity becomes "the stuff of 
which 'patterns' may be found." 188 However, in cases where all vic-
tims were injured simultaneously through, for example, a single fraud-
ulent tender offer or the issuance of bribe payments, the presence of 
multiple victims becomes less indicative of continuous illegal 
behavior.189 
Conversely, activity that defrauds a single entity creates "no infer-
ence that the [single] scheme embodies a threat of continued like activ-
ity in the future." 190 In fact, the presence of a single victim should 
give rise to a presumption against a pattern, especially when the dura-
tion of the illegal activity is short-lived. Cases involving a single vic-
tim usually contain only a "one-shot" effort to inflict a single injury, 191 
which does not suggest that the defendant regularly engages in crimi-
nal conduct. With no evidence or threat of "continued like activity," 
the defrauded plaintiff should be limited to compensatory relief 
through other state and federal fraud remedies; with a single victim, 
treble recovery should not ordinarily be available. 
This is not to say, however, that cases involving a single victim 
,should never give rise to treble recovery. A repeated infliction of eco-
nomic injury upon a single victim, comprising several independent 
criminal decisions and continuing over a long period of time, could 
form the basis for a sufficient allegation of pattern.192 This situation, 
unlike the "one-shot" efforts to defraud, gives rise to a reasonable in-
ference that the perpetrator commits such crimes with regularity, or 
will commit them again.193 
187. See Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pate, 819 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987) ("One factor 
tending to show the existence of a pattern .•• is the presence of multiple victims."). 
188. Gutfreund v. Christoph, 658 F. Supp. 1378, 1393 n.22 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (16 victims 
harmed over several-month period creates pattern). 
189. For examples of these types of simultaneous injuries, see the discussion of the Barkman 
and Northwestern Bell cases in Part IV.C infra. 
190. Eastern Pub. & Adv. v. Chesapeake Pub. & Adv., 831 F.2d 488, 492 (4th Cir. 1987). 
See also Satellite Fin. Planning Corp. v. First Natl. Bank, 646 F. Supp. 118, 120 (D. Del. 1986) 
("The repetition of an act taken against a single victim ... suggests no expansion, no ongoing 
design, no continuity, such as was the target of Congress" in enacting RICO.). 
191. See, e.g., Marshall-Silver Const. Co. v. Mendel, 835 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1987) (pat-
tern not found because of presence of single victim, single injury, and single short-lived scheme to 
defraud), petition for cert filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. Feb. 12, 1988) (No. 87-1358); Mnrks v. 
Pannell Kerr Forster, 811 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1987) (pattern not found because single mailing 
inflicted single injury on single victim). 
192. In Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1988) (No. 87-1262), the defendant prepared nineteen fraudulent 
invoices that were sent to the plaintiff (each involving two acts of mail fraud and one act of wire 
fraud) over a period of seven months. Since each invoice resulted in a distinct injury, the Seventh 
Circuit held that this "repeated infliction of economic injury" was sufficient to establish a pattern 
despite the presence of only one victim. 834 F.2d at 1305. See also Blue Cross v. Nardone, 680 
F. Supp. 195, 199 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("repeated submissions of false claims over a thirteen month 
period form a pattern as defined by the Third Circuit"). 
193. Consequently, the presence of multiple victims should place the plaintiff's civil RICO 
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2. Duration of Illegal Activity 
As part of the focus on ongoing conduct, several courts have noted 
the distinction between "open-ended" and "time-limited" criminal be-
havior.194 Extended, "open-ended" criminal behavior that continues 
over time (such as six months to a year) suggests "that the perpetrator 
has little regard for compliance with the law."195 In United States v. 
Horak, 196 an open-ended demonstration of criminal conduct was sug-
gested by monthly bribe payments lasting over a year. Consequently, 
the court noted that "ongoing bribes of two public officials, even if 
pertinent only to a single ongoing service contract, . . . establish a 
'pattern.' " 197 
In contrast, ·criminal activity limited to a single-day burst is un-
likely to create an inference that such behavior is representative of the 
defendant. As 29.3% of RICO filings in 1986 allege only a "one-place, 
one-time" occurrence of racketeering activity, 198 it is clear that signifi-
cant numbers of "time-limited" RICO cases exist. 
Duration alone, however, should not transform defendant's activi-
ties into a continuing pattern. While duration is one measure of a 
defendant's proclivity for illegal behavior, the presence of a single vic-
tim or the pure repetition of the same type of act could defeat the 
pattern claim.199 For example, in Winer v. Patterson, 200 the plaintiff 
alleged that defendant-broker "churned" the plaintiff's securities trad-
ing account over 200 times in a nearly five-year period in order to 
increase his commissions. Because the defendant's conduct involved 
only one victim and participant, and because "churning" was consid-
ered to comprise only a single commercial transaction, the court found 
claim in the most favorable light. In Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, 832 
F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1987), several bankrupt investors brought fraud charges against the organizers 
of the investment claiming misrepresentations in the initial offering. In upholding plaintiffs' 
§ 1964(c) claim, the Third Circuit found "[m]ost significant[ ]" the fact that over twenty victims 
were involved. 832 F.2d at 39. 
194. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1987) (noting the importance of 
defendant's lengthy and "open-ended" activity). 
195. Mathews & Weissman, supra note 176, at 24. 
196. 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987). 
197. 833 F.2d at 1240. See also United States v. DiGilio, 667 F. Supp. 191, 197 (D.N.J. 
1987) ("Conduct carried on for more than a year has continuity" for pattern.); Black, supra note 
58, at 381 ("Continuity is established by a showing that the predicate acts took place over a 
continuous period of time."). 
198. Blakey & Cessar, RICO Case Study, supra note 16, at 619. 
199. See Flip Mortgage Corp. v. McElhone, 841F.2d531, 538 (4th Cir. 1988) ("the fact that 
the planned injury was inflicted and suffered over a period of years cannot convert this single 
scheme into a pattern"). There are cases, however, where the pure repetition of an illegal act can 
rise to the level of a pattern. In Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), 
petitionforcert.fi/ed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3531 (U.S. Jan. 28, 1988) (No. 87-1262), described in note 192 
supra, the presence of repetitive acts was more than outweighed by the fact that each fraudulent 
invoice constituted a separate lie and resulted in a separate overpayment, with the resulting sepa-
rate injuries to plaintiff. See also note 203 infra and accompanying text. 
200. 663 F. Supp. 723, 726 (D.N.H. 1987). 
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insufficient activity for a pattern.201 
Despite this reasoning, the presence of criminal activity over a sig-
nifi.cant period of time still holds an influential place in the pattern 
debate. Duration should also be considered together with the factors 
described below, which highlight the number of illicit transactions or 
criminal decisions made by the defendant. Often, the reason why cer-
tain conduct is "time-limited" as opposed to "open-ended" derives 
from the fact that a single transaction or criminal decision itself has a 
fixed culmination. 
3. Number of Illicit Transactions 
Because of the number of civil RICO cases involving commercial 
disputes, it is often helpful to analyze the number of distinct commer-
cial transactions present in a RICO dispute. In this context, a "trans-
action" refers to a separate, identifiable commercial transaction -
e.g., a single securities offering, a single tender offer, a single audit 
engagement.202 When multiple transactions are involved, the 
probability increases that the defendant is someone who regularly 
commits such crimes. For example, when the defendant prepares 
nineteen fraudulent invoices at separate times over seven months (and 
commits several acts of mail and wire fraud for each invoice),203 the 
notion of the prolonged, continuing offender has generally been estab-
lished. Alternatively, if fraud, bribery or other misconduct occurs in 
the course of a sole commercial transaction, courts should generally 
not find a pattern, even if the defendant has to commit numerous acts 
of mail or wire fraud to complete the criminal activity.204 Thus, fraud 
or other misconduct committed in the course of (for example) a single 
stock offering usually constitutes the type of isolated offender that 
Congress specifically ordered not be subject to a racketeering claim.205 
201. 663 F. Supp. at 726. The court was also influenced by the fact that churning involves 
the same method of commission over and over again, rather than other criminal transactions, 
which involve other methods (like bribery, misrepresentations, etc.). Other courts, however, 
have concluded that a pattern does exist in these types of churning cases. See, e.g., Robinson v. 
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 674 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. Mich. 1987), appeal dismissed, 841 F.2d 1127 
(6th Cir. 1988). 
202. This test is really a corollary to the different episodes test described in the text accompa-
nying notes 66-69 supra. Focusing on "transactions" as opposed to "episodes,'' however, helps 
courts better analyze the many RICO cases involving commercial fraud. 
203. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 
U.S.L.W. 3531 (Jan. 28, 1988) (No. 87-1262), described in note 192 supra, was just such a case. 
For further discussion of Liquid Air, see note 199 supra. 
204. See, e.g., Eastern Corporate Fed. Credit Union v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 639 
F. Supp. 1532 (D. Mass. 1986). If the activity continued over a long period of time or if several 
discrete bribes or fraudulent misrepresentations were made, a pattern could be found in the con-
text of a single commercial transaction. For an example of such a case, see the discussion accom-
panying notes 218-24 infra. 
205. See 1969 SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 158; see also the text accompanying note 
129 supra. 
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4. Presence of Separate Criminal Decisions 
One important aspect of the number-of-transactions factor is that 
it distinguishes between suits that arise out of a single criminal deci-
sion and those that involve consciously separate criminal acts. Focus-
ing on separate criminal decisions distinguishes these cases in the same 
way. What turns illicit acts into multiple criminal decisions is not easy 
to define, but one might consider the concept of new and independent 
formations of criminal intent. While no court has specifically referred 
to criminal decisions, several cases have suggested its importance. In 
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. Touche Ross & 
Co., 206 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the multiple schemes approach 
because "on seven occasions defendants prepared false financial state-
ments and rel,)Orts they knew would be mailed to the banks." In an-
other case, the Seventh Circuit found a pattern because each 
fraudulent tax return filed was a separate lie and resulted in a separate 
underpayment, independent of the other lies and underpayments. 207 
In both these cases, the court was impressed by independent forma-
tions of criminal intent that manifested itself in repeated criminal ac-
tivity. 208 Just as in the transactions analysis above, the presence of 
several examples of criminal intent create an inference that the defen-
dant commits such crimes with regularity and thus should bear 
RICO's severe penalties.209 
5. Factors That Confuse the Analysis 
While the above factors pinpoint the extent of a civil RICO de-
fendant's criminal activity, other factors currently in use by the courts 
tend to cloud the pattern debate. For example, some courts have 
looked to whether each alleged act caused a separate and independent 
injury.210 While distinct injuries might generally support finding a 
pattern, it is not necessary to require that each act cause a separate 
206. 782 F.2d 966, 971 (11th Cir. 1986). 
207. Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1985). 
208. For additional examples of this reasoning, see United States v. DiGilio, 667 F. Supp. 
191, 197 (D.N.J. 1987) (repeated instances of extortion represents multiple formations of crimi-
nal intent); Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 550, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
("RICO predicate acts must each be independently motivated criminal episodes .... "); Ghouth 
v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 642 F. Supp. 1325, 1339 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (four acts of forgery 
"were not simply ministerial acts to accomplish one fraud, but [rather were] four independently 
motivated crimes"). 
209. For further discussion of the significance of independent criminal decisions, see Ma-
thews & Weissman, supra note 176, at 21-22. 
210. See, e.g., Long Distance Serv., Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 3 Civ. RICO 
Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 3 (May 3, 1988) (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1988) (refusing to find "pattern" in part 
because of single non-distinct injury to the plaintiff); Thompson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc., 652 F. 
Supp. 1222, 1227 (D. Utah 1987) ("The occurrence of multiple injuries and independent harms 
... may be the most relevant inquiry."); Ghouth v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 
1325, 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("the most important factor is that the criminal acts cause 'indepen-
dent harmful significance' "). 
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harm, as all RICO requires is a single injury to business or property 
resulting from a pattern of conduct. As one court noted, "[i]t would 
be illogical to require a plaintiff to show that all ... acts . . . injured 
him, e8pecially in view of the fact that many such acts may be some-
what distinct and separate in time."211 
Besides the independent-injury-causing-events test, courts have 
looked to the number of participants in the alleged crime,212 the un-
derlying purpose of the criminal scheme,213 and the character214 and 
ultimate result215 of the defendant's illicit activity. These factors are 
much less helpful in defining "pattern" because they do not focus on 
the continuing. extent of the perpetrator's activity. The purposes or 
i:esults of a criminal scheme tell us little about continuity or the de-
fendant's proclivity for committing such crimes again. Similarly, the 
alleged character of the particular conduct, whether it be directed at a 
"legitimate goal" or more along the lines of traditional "mobster-type" 
activity, should not be decisive. RICO proscribes continuous illegal 
behavior regardless of the goals of the racketeering activity.216 
Ultimately, the four factors identified above provide the best ap-
proach to the pattern riddle. Unlike the approach solely focusing on 
relatedness, the multi-factors approach respects the command of 
Sedima and the intent of Congress to focus on continuity. And unlike 
the multiple schemes or different episodes tests, this analysis presents 
the judiciary with a workable, flexible solution that does not consist of 
conclusory and imprecise terminology. 
C. Applying the Factors 
When courts examine a RICO defendant's conduct using these 
four factors, they will gain a much more comprehensive perspective on 
the wrongdoer's proclivity for illegal behavior. Indeed, the factors 
listed in this Note provide the courts with a more finely tuned test for 
continuity than the other multi-factor tests currently in use.211 To 
demonstrate this, consider the following two examples. 
211. Marshall & Ilsley Trust Co. v. Pat~, 819 F.2d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 1987). 
212. See, e.g., Saporito v. Combustion Eng., Inc., No. 87-5144, slip. op. at 26 (3d Cir. Mar. 
29, 1988); Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Natl. State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1987). 
213. See, e.g., Schaafsma v. Marriner, 641 F. Supp. 576, 581 (D. Vt. 1986). 
214. See, e.g., Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Natl. State, 832 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 
1987); see also, Saporito v. Combustion Eng., Inc., No. 87-5144, slip. op. at 26 n.17 (3d Cir. Mar. 
29, 1988) (not applying the character test, but suggesting that "the character of the activ-
ity ... may be relevant to the determination in some cases"). 
215. See, e.g., Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 628 F. Supp. 163, 166 (D. Colo. 1986), affd., 810 
F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1987). 
216. In addition to this problem, inserting a subjective factor such as "character of the activ-
ity" can lead to qualitative value judgments about the conduct at issue, further clouding the 
pattern debate. But see Saporito, slip. op. at 26 n.17 ("the character of the activity ••• may be 
relevant to the pattern determination in some cases"). 
217. See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text. 
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In Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., 218 a former shareholder of a target 
corporation brought an action against the target corporation, the ac-
quiring corporation and other defendants, asserting various claims 
arising out of the allegedly fraudulent acquisition of the target com-
pany. The predicate acts included (1) mailing copies of the fraudulent 
tender offer to all shareholders; (2) receiving tendered shares and issu-
ing payment through the mail; (3) mailing a fraudulent recommenda-
tion letter to all the shareholders; and ( 4) filing false statements with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission.219 
In such a case, a pattern is clearly demonstrated. First, multiple 
victims were harmed by the fraudulent tender offer, as each share-
holder was personally defrauded out of varying sums of money. As 
the district court noted: "Each of the approximately 5,500 sharehold-
ers is an individual victim with a distinct injury .... " 220 Second, the 
fraudulent activity was sufficiently continuous over time. The earliest 
transaction, the defective SEC filings, occurred in November 1980, 
and the latest transaction, mailing cover-up payoffs to several broker-
age houses, occurred in "early 1982."221 Thus, despite the presence of 
only a single fraudulent scheme, the defendant's activity was suffi-
ciently open-ended to create a strong inference that the defendant con-
tinually had "little regard for compliance with the law."222 
While the third factor, multiple illicit transactions, cannot be 
demonstrated in this case since all the activity relates to one overall 
securities offering, this absence is more than offset by the presence of 
five independent criminal decisions. The defendants in this case first 
mailed the fraudulent tender offer and recommendations, induced the 
plaintiff-shareholders into selling their stock at an inferior price, filed 
fraudulent statements with the SEC, extended payoffs to several bro-
kerage houses "aimed at concealing the overall scheme,"223 and finally 
failed to file an SEC disclosure statement. Each of these actions re-
quired separate formations of criminal intent, and were not just re-
peated instances of the same transgression. As the court noted in 
reference to defendant's conduct: "This is the stuff from which pat-
terns may be found."224 
In addition to Barkman, the Eighth Circuit's ruling in H.J. Inc. v. 
Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 225 a decision soon to be reviewed by 
218. 674 F. Supp. 623 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
219. 674 F. Supp. at 630. 
220. 674 F. Supp. at 632. 
221. 674 F. Supp. at 631. 
222. Mathews & Weisman, supra note 176, at 24. 
223. 674 F. Supp. at 632. 
224. 674 F. Supp. at 632. 
225. 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), ajfg., 648 F. Supp. 419 (D. Minn. 1986), cert. granted, 108 
s. Ct. 1219 (1988). 
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the Supreme Court, provides an excellent illustration of how the four 
factors should operate. There, the plaintiff accused the defendant util-
ity of conducting a far-ranging scheme designed to illegally influence 
several members of the state regulatory commission responsible for 
establishing telephone rates.226 The allegedly corrupting acts included 
payments to several members of the commission, offers of employment 
to these commissioners, and assorted free gifts. 227 Although these il-
licit activities continued for over five years, the district court dismissed 
plaintiff's RICO claim because all the allegations were "committed in 
furtherance of a single scheme .... "228 Applying essentially the same 
reasoning, the Eighth Circuit affirmed.229 
Using the factors suggested in this Note mandates a different re-
sult.230 Even though the presence of multiple victims in this case is 
not truly indicative of continuous behavior since all the victims, the 
utilities customers, were injured simultaneously from each illegal act, 
the duration of the defendant's activity and the presence of numerous 
independent criminal decisions clearly indicate a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity. First, the illicit activity was sufficiently continuous over 
time, as the earliest attempts to influence the commissioners with gifts 
occurred in July 1980 and continued uninterrupted through 1985.231 
Second, and more vital, these actions required discrete formations of 
criminal intent. From an offer of employment made to a commission 
member in November 1984, to outright bribe payments offered to vari-
ous members from 1983-85, to the provision of free vacations to still 
other commissioners during 1985, the defendant's conduct constituted 
several diverse and independently motivated crimes and were not just 
repeated instances of the same act. Attempting to influence several 
state officers through cash payments, job offers, and free gifts over a 
five-year period certainly creates a strong inference of continuous ille-
gal behavior. The treble damage remedy should be available to its 
victims. 
As Barkman and Northwestern Bell illustrate, analyzing a defen-
dant's conduct using these four factors can properly identify the con-
tinuing offender, the criminal entity most deserving of the treble 
226. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 648 F. Supp. 419, 420.22 (D. Minn. 1986), 
for a detailed discussion of the facts. 
227. 648 F. Supp. at 421. 
228. 648 F. Supp. at 425. 
229. H.J. Inc., 829 F.2d at 650. 
230. Interestingly, U.S. District Judge Harry MacLaughlin actually utilized a multi·factor 
approach in a subsequent opinion rejecting plaintiff's motion to reconsider the original dismissal. 
See HJ. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 653 F. Supp. 908, 914-16 (D. Minn. 1987). While 
admitting that the plaintiff had "alleged criminal activity oflong duration," Judge MacLaughlin 
refused to find a pattern because each predicate act did not have "independent harmful signifi· 
cance" and because the acts were not a "regular part of the way" that defendants conducted their 
business. 653 F. Supp. at 915-16. 
231. 648 F. Supp. at 421. 
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damage penalty. It is important, however, that courts apply these fac-
tors together and interchangeably. None of these factors should take 
on a life of its own, as have the multiple schemes and different episodes 
tests. As noted by the Seventh Circuit: "The doctrinal requirement of 
a pattern of racketeering activity is a standard, not a rule, and as such 
its determination depends on the facts and circumstances of the partic-
ular case, with no one factor being necessarily determinative."232 By 
using these four factors together, civil RICO cases can be properly 
limited to the criminals presenting the greatest threat to society. 
V. THE BROADER ISSUE: THE SUFFICIENCY OF CURRENT 
CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS To AMEND CIVIL RICO 
While the suggestions made in this Note can help courts narrow 
civil RICO's applicability, the broader issue posed by the pattern de-
bate still remains: how to amend civil RICO permanently. While the 
suggestions presented here for the interpretation of section 1961(5) can 
justifiably be undertaken by the judiciary after Sedima, more signifi-
cant limitations of civil RICO will have to come from Congress. Cur-
rently, there are two proposals under consideration by Congress that 
would dramatically reduce the scope of the treble damage remedy.233 
These bills, S. 1523 and H.R. 2983,234 ignore the pattern requirement 
altogether; rather, they attack the treble damage remedy by tailoring 
the level of recovery to the nature of the individual or entity injured. 
For example, under both bills, suits brought by "businesses" (which of 
course comprise a large percentage of civil RICO plaintiffs) would be 
limited to actual damages, attorney's fees, and costs, unless the wrong-
doer had been convicted of an underlying predicate activity or RICO 
violation, in which case treble damage recovery would be allowable.235 
232. Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 976 (7th Cir. 1986). 
233. See RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 11 6041 (1987). Prior to these bills, Congress had 
tried to do what the Second Circuit in Sedima attempted, which was to create a statutory re-
quirement that the RICO defendant first be convicted of an underlying predicate act. In August 
1986, H.R. 5445 was introduced by Rep. Boucher to the House Judiciary Committee, where it 
was ultimately passed by the House but narrowly rejected in the Senate. See note 152 supra. The 
bill would have eliminated treble damages under civil RICO unless the defendant was convicted 
of a RICO violation or a predicate act. Although defeated, H.R. 5445 marked the starting point 
for RICO reform in the lOOth Congress. . 
234. S. 1523, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. REC. SI0,501-03 (daily ed. July 22, 1987) 
(introduced by Senator Metzenbaum (D-Ohio)); H.R. 2983, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CoNG. 
REc. H6563 (daily ed. July 22, 1987) (introduced by Frederick Boucher (D-Va.)). 
235. Where suits were brought by consumers or by special purpose units of the government, 
both bills would allow the plaintiff to recover up to twice the amount of their actual damages. 
Additional recovery would be based on particularly egregious behavior, defined as conduct per-
formed with "conscious and wanton disregard of the consequences to the plaintiff .... " When 
"general purpose" units of the federal, state and local government are suing as plaintiffs, both 
bills would authorize treble damage recovery. H.R. 2983, § 2 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)); S. 
1523, § 2 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). Finally, both bills eliminate all references to the term 
"racketeer" in the entire statute, and replace it with the term "unlawful" or in some few cases 
"criminal," ostensibly to soften the denigrating label that comes with a RICO conviction. H.R. 
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In addition, under intense pressure from the securities industry, both 
the House and Senate bills would eliminate treble damages if either 
state or federal securities laws provide an "express or implied" remedy 
for the type of injury presented. This "securities exemption," how-
ever, would be disallowed if a violation of the federal insider trading 
statute was involved.236 
Unfortunately, neither S. 1523 nor H.R. 2983 addresses the re-
quirements for a pattern of racketeering activity.237 Insteaa, both S. 
1523 and H.R. 2983 would virtually eliminate the treble damage rem-
edy in many civil RICO filings. The main problem with civil RICO, 
however, is not with the treble damage remedy itself, but rather with 
how the remedy is applied. Determining the proper civil RICO de-
fendant has become the issue that has most plagued the courts. There-
fore, Congress should concentrate on the question of liability and what 
types of offenders it wishes to target, and not on the remedy provided. 
Certain "businesses," having engaged in repeated criminal activity, de-
serve RICO's harsh penalties regardless of who is bringing the suit. 
Limiting the treble damage remedy to government or citizen plaintiffs 
denies an effective remedy and deterrent to the class of business plain-
tiffs who have been injured by professional criminals. 
Restricting the treble damage remedy is thus an inadvisable way to 
limit civil RICO. Indeed, the bills currently under consideration fail 
to resolve the basic problem with civil RICO: they do not identify or 
distinguish between the kinds of cases which should be brought under 
RICO and those which should not. Since the pattern requirement was 
originally designed to provide this guidance, the current congressional 
focus should seek to remedy the problems that result from its ambigui-
ties. Thus, even if congressional legislation is passed shortly,238 the 
2983, § 1 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1963, 1968); S. 1523, § 1 (amending 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-
1963, 1968). See note 162 supra (referring to pressures associated with the "racketeer" label). 
236. As of this writing, the House and Senate bills diverged on the issue of securities inves· 
tors. The Senate bill (S. 1523, § 2 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)) would still allow recovery of 
treble damages if the victim was a "small investor." Small investors are defined in the bill as 
(1) having portfolios "valued at less than or equal to the median portfolio value of all United 
States securities holders," or (2) possessing household incomes of no more than the U.S. median. 
Accordingly, S. 1523 requires the SEC to publish annually a survey indicating the nation's me-
dian portfolio. See S. 1523, § 2 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). 
This small investor exception has met with considerable opposition from the American Insti-
tute of Certified Public Accountants, and it is expected that the Senate Judiciary Committee will 
soon vote to delete this provision from S. 1523. See Senate Judiciary Postpones Action on Civil 
RICO Refonn, 3 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1 (Mar. 29, 1988). 
237. See Congress Likely To Act on RICO Reform, But "Pattern" Probably Will Be Left 
Alone, 2 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 32, at 3 (Jan. 21, 1987). A third bill, sponsored by Rep. 
Conyers, has also been introduced in the lOOth Congress. Under the "pro-consumer" H.R. 3240, 
the pattern requirement would be amended to include "at least two acts of racketeering activity 
or fraudulent activity, or both ... that are ... related to the affairs of an enterprise; .•. not 
isolated, but they need not be part of a common scheme or plan .... " See H.R. 3240, lOOth 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see also Conyers Introduces RICO Bill Adding Bank Fraud as Predicate, 3 
Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 1 (Sept. 15, 1987). 
238. Given the election year and the existence of more pressing business in the House and 
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problems of construing pattern will continue to plague the courts. 239 
Since Congress has chosen to ignore this serious shortcoming of 
RICO, it is up to the courts to identify the kinds of cases that merit 
civil RICO prosecutions. Using the four factors outlined in this Note 
shou1d allow the courts to accomplish this task. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The interpretive challenge posed by RICO's pattern requirement 
has caused one of the most divisive judicial conflicts in recent memory. 
This Note attempts to provide some clarity to the debate by providing 
the courts with a comprehensive framework for analyzing the merits 
of each RICO prosecution. By concentrating on the number of vic-
tims injured, the duration of the defendant's illicit activity, the number 
of separate transactions, and the presence of mu1tiple and distinct 
criminal decisions, courts will be able to apply consistently the treble 
damage remedy against the most pernicious offenders. 
The broad language of RICO, originally drafted to enable govern-
ment prosecutors to combat the increasing influence of structured 
criminality effectively, has been abused by private plaintiffs seeking 
treble recovery. Faced with RICO disputes better suited to state 
courts or more deserving of other federal remedies, courts have often 
tried to craft new restrictions onto the statute. While rejecting these 
attempts as illegitimate judicial lawmaking, the Supreme Court in 
Sedima redirected the judiciary's attention to a previously unexplored 
operative provision: the pattern of racketeering activity requirement. 
Severe inconsistency has resu1ted because the Sedima Court pro-
vided little guidance in its opaque footnote 14. None of the major 
approaches developed by the courts of appeals can be consistently ap-
plied; even worse, none of these approaches respect Congress' original 
desire to deny to the continuing violator the economic fruits of orga-
nized criminal activity. By rejecting these approaches in favor of a 
more complex analysis, the mu1ti-factor approach can help the judici-
ary separate the meritorious RICO claims from the meritless ones. 
Senate Judiciary Comittees, it is doubtful that major amendments will pass in 1988. See Senate 
Judiciary Postpones Action on Civil RICO Reform, 3 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 42, at 1 (Mar. 
29, 1988); Mathews, Weissman & Hardin, RICO Reform: Will the Litigious Lion Be Tamed? 
(unpublished article on file with the Michigan Law Review) ("[P]rospects for reform this session 
are remote because of the pressure of more urgent legislative tasks."). See also Blakey, "Time Is 
Running Out" for Congress To Revise RICO in 1988, Blakey Says, 3 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 
35, at 1 (Feb. 9, 1988); Nathan, A Col/for Congressional Action To Reform RICO, 3 Civ. RICO 
Rep. (BNA) No. 35, at 4 (Feb. 9, 1988). 
239. "Suits brought under civil RICO will continue almost entirely unabated •.. [even with 
passage of RICO legislation in 1988] because the legislation under consideration does not change 
the requirements for 'pattern of racketeering,' .... " Securities Exemption Supported by A/CPA 
as "Critical" to RICO, 3 Civ. RICO Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 4 (Apr. 26, 1988) (statement of 
Philip Lacovara, spokesman for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). 
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Only then can the original designs of the federal racketeering laws be 
adequately respected. 
- Ethan M. Posner 
